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INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and 1970s, East Asia became an 
economically dynamic part of the Third World. Small 
countries with little in the way of domestic markets or 
natural resources, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore, experienced rapid economic growth 
with improved quality of life indicators based on export- 
oriented production of manufactured goods under the 
Export Promotion (EP) trade strategy.
When these four countries prospered beyond 
expectations, questions arose in the field of
international political economy : What were the specific
conditions that made possible the success of an EP 
strategy in these ’'newly industrializing countries 
(NIGs )”? Do other developing countries have a similar 
chance of success with the EP model ?
During the 1980s Turkey employed a similar strategy 
of trade liberalization with economic reforms of 
stabilization. However, although high export levels and 
economic growth rates were acquired, the implementation 
of the EP strategy in Turkey failed to control inflation 
and unemployment and to correct the unequitable 
distribution of income.
The relatively less impressive success of the 
Turkish economy under the EP strategy raises questions 
such as : What are the reasons for the differences in the
performances of Turkey and the NICs ?
This comparative study is an attempt to adress these
questions. Part I is designed as a brief review of the 
literature on the EP strategy in an effort to provide a 
theoretical basis for the topic. Part II, ’Export 
Promotion in practice : the NIC performance” assesses the 
success of the NICs under the EP strategy by examining 
the implementation of the strategy in NICs, together with 
the economic background, government policies and the 
statistical measures of the performances of the four 
countries in question. This part also attempts to 
provide an explanation for the success of NICs through an 
analysis of factors unique to these countries and 
examines the possible consequences of the adoption of EP 
by other developing countries.
Part III analyzes the implementation of the same 
strategy in Turkey. To better understand the roots of 
Turkish foreign trade policies, Part III provides a brief 
overview of the economic and political background of the 
Turkish economic structure and also includes an extensive 
description of the reforms of the 1980s. After an 
examination of the indicators of economic performance in 
Turkey under these reforms. Part III also includes an 
attempt to explain the reasons for the relatively lower 
success rates of Turkey under the EP strategy in 
comparison with the NICs.
The conclusion of the study draws the results of 
this comparative analysis and discusses possible 
prospects for the Turkish economy.
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I.EXPORT PROMOTION IN THEORY
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In the 1950s many developing countries, especially 
Latin American countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, and 
others which became part of the world international trade 
as primary product producers-exporters, implemented 
inward-oriented trade policies with high trade barriers, 
tariffs and regulations, trying to foster 
industrialization through import-substitution in an 
effort to raise growth rates and living standards, and to 
reduce ’dependence” on the international division of 
labor .
These efforts and policies were mostly based on the 
rejection of the doctrine of comparative advantage and 
were also associated with the policy prescription that 
developing countries should specialize in the production 
and export of primary commodities in exchange of 
manufactures,
However, in the 1960s, after a period of 
experimentation with inward-oriented trade policies, most 
of these countries switched to export promotion (EP) and 
displayed varying rates of economic growth and success. 
Although, in the late 20th century export promotion has 
itself become a major strategy used to acquire foreign 
exchange (for imports) and to promote economic growth, it 
is beneficial to examine first the Liberal theory of 
international trade as the basis of the export promotion 
strategy and then analyze export promotion itself.
The Liberal international trade theory rests 
ultimately upon the belief that economic specialization 
produces gains in productive efficiency and national 
income. In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith argued 
that the key to national wealth and power was the 
division of labor dependent upon the scale of the market.
Building on Smith's ideas, Ricardo established the 
law of comparative advantage and demonstrated that
international trade is mutually beneficial. According to 
Ricardo, countries will tend to specialize in those 
commodities whose costs are comparatively lowest. Even 
though a nation may have an absolute advantage in the 
production of every good, specialization in those goods 
with the lowest comparative costs, leaving the production 
of other goods to other countries, enables all to gain 
more from trade.
The neoclassical reformulation of the liberal theory 
has become known as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O) 
model of international trade and was the standard liberal 
position of the 1980s. The theory maintains that a
nation’s comparative advantage is determined by the 
relative abundance and most profitable combination of its 
several factors of production, such as capital, labor, 
resources, management, and technology.
The above mentioned formulations on international 
trade from Ricardo to H-0 represent the classical and 
neoclassical theories and examine a world economy of the 
past. Unlike these, newer theories attempt to account
- 4 -
for a world in which capital is highly mobile and 
products are exchanged at every step of the process, from 
technological knowledge to the final product itself 
(Gilpin 1987, 177).
In this new economic environment the rise of Japan 
and the NICs has led to an important change in the status 
of the concept of comparative advantage. This
fundamental principle of liberal trade theory has lost 
some of its relevance and predictive power (Corden 1984,
a). Thus, classical liberalism’s explanation of trade 
patterns, based on the intensity and abundance of the 
factors of production, is of declining relevance to a 
world of intra-industry trade and rapid technological 
diffusion. Now comparative advantage is regarded as a 
dynamic product of corporate and state policies (Gilpin 
1987, 178).
- 5 -
PROTECTIONISM
While examining liberal trade policy as a basis for 
export promotion, economic protectionism and its main 
arguments against free trade should also be analyzed in 
an effort to understand why most countries adopt 
protectionist policies and to acknowledge the limitations 
of the liberal trade theory.
Liberals believe that protectionism is a test to see 
whether a nation really does have an inherent comparative 
advantage in a particular industry. They regard
protectionism as a necessary but temporary venture and a
stepping stone to a system of free trade (Gilpin 1987, 
185) .
Economic nationalists, on the other hand, tend to 
regard protectionism as an end itself. Their foremost 
objective, in the short run, is state building and 
industrial power. The fundamental purpose of a tariff is 
to establish particular industries.
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a) The Infant Industry Argument:
According to this argument, when a difference exists 
between marginal social and marginal private costs, free 
trade may not allow a country's true comparative
advantage situation to develop. In such a situation, 
trade, according to this view, should be temporarily 
protected during its initial high cost period, until a 
stable pattern of international specialization is 
established (Tuna 1988, 9).
The basis for the infant industry argument is the 
lowering of production costs through an educative 
process. To be able to compete with foreign producers on 
equal terms, the infant industry should grow in size and 
become mature through a process of ’learning by doing.” 
Only through this way can an infant industry lower its 
costs and overcome the disadvantages of being an 
’infant . ”
Against this argument free trade advocates claim that 
when all infant industries receive protection, none of 
them receive a special benefit and thus, a devaluation or
deflation is more preferable to protection in the form of 
tariffs and subsidies (Tuna 1988, 10). According to
advocates of the export promotion policy, there exists no 
justifiable point in the infant industry argument that 
indicates that import substitution, or more generally 
protection, is preferable to an unbiased or export- 
oriented strategy for trade and growth (Krueger 1984, 
148) .
b) The Optimum Tariff Argument:
In order to improve their terms of trade, Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs) are inclined to use tariff 
restrictions. However, for most LDCs such a policy 
argument tends to be irrelevant since very few of them 
possess monopoly or monopsony power to maintain income 
transfer through an improvement of terms of trade.
c) Balance of Payments Argument:
In an effort to reduce their balance of payments 
deficit, both Developed Countries (DCs) and LDCs use 
tariffs from time to time. Such a policy may seem to be 
optimal in the short run, however, in general, a 
reduction in the expenditure or a devaluation is 
considered to be more preferable.
d) Distortions In the Factor Markets :
In the presence of large unskilled unemployed labor 
in most LDCs with high industry wages and low 
agricultural wages, a tariff on importable industry is 
sometimes advocated as an offset against high cost of 
labor. However, given the imperfections of the labor
- 7 -
market in the LDCs, a tariff leads to an inefficient 
resource allocation and can never be an optimal policy. 
Subsidies should be preferred instead of tariffs (Tuna 
1988, 11).
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EXPORT PROMOTION :
Export Promotion (EP) or Export-Led Growth model 
emphasizes the importance of an outward-oriented trade 
strategy for the economic growth of developing countries. 
A trade policy based on Export Promotion is the one in 
which there is no bias of the incentive structure toward 
favoring production of import substitutes. Under Export
Promotion some industries may be encouraged by special 
incentives. However, those incentives would be at least 
as great for the production of exports than for
production for sale in domestic markets. An export- 
oriented policy entails less of a departure from free 
trade and equalized incentives than the Import
Substitution strategy (Krueger 1984, 140).
According to this model, export earnings enable 
developing countries to import capital goods and the 
intermediate inputs necessary for investment and 
production at full potential. Exports have been a
significant factor in overcoming external debt problems 
and also in achieving high levels of growth. Postwar 
experience has shown that countries that attained high 
export levels have also achieved high economic growth 
rates. In addition, growth in export earnings enabled
some LDCs with external debt problems to make orderly 
payments on their debt from 1973 to 1983 (Cline 1983, 
1 2 0 ) .
The EP strategy can also be considered as the 1970s 
version of the '’engine of growth" approach. This approach 
differs from the orthodox-free-trade argument in that, it 
emphasizes resource allocation and structural adjustment, 
and hence, considers short- as well as long-term problems 
of development.
The supply effects expected from the liberalization 
of the external sector of the economy stemmed from the 
belief that export promotion would lead to an improvement 
in the balance of payments that, in turn, would favorably 
affect the imports of capital goods, raw materials, and 
other inputs, expanding the supply capacity of the 
economy (Khan 1987, 48).
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CHARACTERISTICS OF AN EXPORT PROMOTION STRATEGY :
In an Export Promotion strategy exporters (also 
importers) are permitted ready access to intermediate and 
capital goods. Under such a strategy, exchange rates are 
fairly realistic and there exist equal incentives to sell 
abroad as well as to sell domestically, with the 
consequence that most firms base their capacity on 
expected domestic and foreign sales.
Under EP most incentives are structured in such a 
way that they apply to all exporters and are based on 
either the dollar value of export sales or the value
added in export sales. This results in a uniformity in 
the incentives confronting producers of different 
products, at least in the export markets.
In addition, export oriented policies generally 
avoid the use of tariffs and the quantitative
restrictions in an effort to ease exporters' access to 
international market at international prices.
According to Krueger, contrary to the inherent view 
in the Import Substitution strategy, becoming a part of 
the international market through free trade reduces 
dependence on the international economy. Under Export 
Promotion strategy dependence on the international 
economy is reduced since foreign exchange earnings 
necessary for the purchase of imported inputs and capital 
goods grow rapidly, markets become increasingly 
diversified and the economy more flexible (Krueger 1984, 
142) .
An export-oriented strategy permits a developing 
country to establish economically efficient sizes of 
plants and to maintain long production runs, regardless 
of the size of its domestic market. Thus, a developing 
country can overcome the limitations of a small domestic 
market, at least for traded goods under an EP strategy. 
Moreover, in such an economy specialized products that 
are not produced domestically can be obtained at 
internationally competitive prices.
Usually, unskilled labor constitutes the basis of 
the resource endowment of developing countries. It is
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widely recognized that the rate of human and physical 
formation together with the abundant unskilled labor 
forms a constraint on expanding the industrial sector in 
most LDCs .
According to Nas , when factor proportions differ 
significantly among industrial sectors, Export Promotion 
strategy leads to a more rapid growth of value added and 
employment of unskilled labor in industry for the same 
rate of human and capital formation under other 
strategies. Especially when there exists a wide range of 
factor intensities for industrial processes, countries 
whose economies are outward-oriented (toward
international market) will experience fairly rapid 
expansion of the relatively unski11ed-1abor-using
industries (Nas 1988, 30).
Another characteristic of the Export Promotion 
strategy is that, under such a liberal trade regime, 
exporters have access to international markets for their 
intermediate inputs. They are able to reduce production 
costs, since their freedom of choice under the EP 
strategy permits them access to the cheapest source. 
Thus, exporters have the opportunity to consider quality, 
delivery date, reliability and other advantages while 
purchasing intermediate goods.
Under the Export Promotion strategy the economic 
behavior of businessmen, investors, entrepreneurs and 
engineers also follow a different path, due to the 
competitive environment. In Import Substitution, the
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absence of competition probably reduces the concern of 
entrepreneurs about economic efficiency. High-cost firms 
lose their market share and low-cost firms expand more 
slowly. Low-cost firms can expand at a desired rate 
unconstrained by raw material availability or the price 
elasticity of domestic demand for the firm’s product (Lee 
1992, 190).
Factors To Be Considered Under Export Promotion:
The economic and trade policies that countries 
follow usually reflect themselves in the export
performance of those countries. The policies of high 
protection and the overvaluation of exchange rates 
followed by many developing countries in the 1950s and 
1960s caused poor export performance for many developing 
count r i e s.
Therefore, the trend has shifted to outward-oriented 
trade policies based on EP strategy instead of placing 
emphasis on IS. However, according to some analysts, 
while adopting an Export Promotion policy, certain
factors should be taken into consideration in order to 
reach high export growth levels and also to benefit from 
the efficiency-stimulating influence of international 
compe t i tion.
According to Meier, if the export sector is to be a 
propelling force in development, it should not remain 
separated from the rest of the economy ; instead it 
should be an ’’integrated sector.” An integrated process 
should be established, diffusing stimuli from the export
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sector and creating responses elsewhere in the economy 
(Meier 1989, 389). Hence, in the ”integrative-process”
different export commodities should provide different 
stimuli according to the technological characteristics of 
their production.
In other words, the developments and the production 
in the export sector should have linkage effects which 
also benefit the other sectors in the economy. For 
example, more favorable linkages may stem from exports 
that require skilled labor than from those using
unskilled labor through the movement of educated, skilled 
workers to other sectors (Meier 1989, 390).
Apart from the linkages that originate from the 
export sector, under EP the nature of the production of 
the export commodity also constitutes an influence on the 
overall economy by determining the distribution of income 
and in turn , the pattern of local demand and employment. 
The use of different factor combinations affect the 
relative shares of profit, wages, interests, and rent 
according to the labor or capital intensity of the export 
production and the nature of its organization.
However, for the Export Promotion strategy to be 
effective in stimulating the growth of the economy, 
certain conditions such as ; a developed infrastructure 
for the economy, well established market institutions, 
extensive human resources, limited price distortions that 
affect resource allocations, and a capacity to bear risks 
are necessary (Meier 1989, 392).
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Policy Effects :
The commitment to an export-oriented development 
strategy implies a fairly liberal trade regime which 
would prevent paperwork, delays, bureaucratic regulation, 
and other costs that can arise under more protectionist 
regimes.
Gilpin points out that the most important lesson to 
be drawn from Japan and the NICs (successful employers of 
the Export Promotion policy as a trade strategy) relates 
to the changing conception of comparative advantage. 
These countries have demonstrated that comparative 
advantage in a macro sense can be created through 
appropriate national policies that facilitate the 
accumulation of the factors of production (Gilpin 1987, 
214) .
The trade policy of a country, containing 
restrictions/incentives, regulations, discriminations, 
and so on, greatly influences the trade performance, 
industrial growth and the overall success of the economy.
The government policy instruments that seek to 
regulate and control through negative means are less 
likely to achieve the intended results than those that 
create incentives for individuals to carry out desired 
courses of activity.
For example, if exchange rate is permitted to become 
overvalued, lagging exports are more visible under Export 
Promotion than are the rising premiums by Import 
Substitution. Similarly, under highly restrictive
- 1 4 -
quantitative restrictions, the reward for evading them is 
substantial and the enforcement is possible only with 
detailed scrunity of all incoming goods.
According to Krueger, in Export Promotion 
unrealistic exchange rates can be maintained only if 
export subsidies continue to make exporting profitable . 
However, when overvaluation of the currency increases, 
the cost of subsidies also grows and these costs provide 
feedback and incentives for officials to support moves 
toward a realistic exchange-rate (Krueger 1984, 151).
By its nature, an Export Promotion policy rewards 
exporters and is nondiscriminatory among exportables. 
Moreover, under such a strategy misrepresentation of 
performance is smaller since the surrender of foreign 
exchange proceeds is sufficient proof of exports. In any 
case, a fairly realistic exchange rate under Export 
Promotion provides little incentive for misrepresenting 
performance.
On the other hand, an important aspect of the EP 
strategy is the realization that it is a policy that 
requires long-term perspective which forsees the 
elimination of barriers on all present and future goods.
The implication of this requirement is that a long­
term political commitment is needed for the success of EP 
strategy. Here, the dilemma is that the probable adverse 
effects of liberalization on employment and income 
distribution under the EP strategy in the short-run may 
render it politically unacceptable and may lead
- 1 5 -
to an "on and off" approach to liberalization and hence 
to its failure (Calvo 1987, 15).
Thus, if implemented with a long-term perspective 
and total commitment, the EP strategy, with its positive 
means of trade regulation and incentives may lead to 
rapid economic growth through increased volume of 
exports. The following chapters include descriptions of 
the NIC and Turkish performance under the EP strategy in 
an effort to provide an insight on the reasons for the 
difference in the results of the strategy.
- 1 6 -
II· EXPORT PROMOTION IN PRACTICE : THE NIC PERFORMANCE
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In 1973 a dozen countries accounted for 84 % of the 
exports of manufactured goods from developing countries : 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. By 1976 developing countries 
that exported manufactures on a global scale had narrowed 
down to South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore 
from East Asia, India from South Asia and Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina from Latin America. Together these eight
countries accounted for over three quarters of the 
manufactured exports from the developing world in 1976 
(Turner 1982 , 10) .
The East Asian NICs have continued to be the most
dynamic exporters of manufactures and they are the 
largest in volume. The Export Promotion (EP) strategy
and export-led growth, through making the best use of 
comparative advantage (based on skilled labor) has become 
the hallmark of the four East Asian NICs and they are of 
the greatest interest in understanding the NIC phenomenon 
and how EP leads to economic success in certain
count r i es .
After providing the background information and 
statistical data on these countries this chapter will 
examine the implementation of the EP strategy in four 
East Asian NICs and will question the reasons for their 
success, through questions such as: Why were they able to
export large volumes of manufactured goods and achieve
high growth rates under the EP strategy? Which factors 
inherent in these countries' culture, political and
social environment and in their implementation of the EP 
strategy have led to higher economic growth when compared 
with other LDCs that used the same strategy?
INDICATORS OF SUCCESS : THE STATISTICS
In 1963, Pacific Area developing countries had
relatively low income levels. Apart from Hong Kong and 
Singapore they had lower per capita incomes than many of 
the Latin American countries. The situation changed 
dramatically in the following 25 years. By 1988, all
four of the East Asian NICs surpassed the per capita 
incomes of every Latin American country. During the
1963- 1988 period, the per capita incomes of the four 
East Asian NICs increased between four and a half and six 
times (Balassa 1991, 1). [ See Table 1.1 for data and 
explanation]
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Exports
The East Asian NICs attained high rates of economic
growth in an open economy as shown by their high export- 
GDP ratios [See Table 1.2 ]. In South Korea and Taiwan,
the export-GDP ratio increased greatly between 1963 and
1987, indicating the leading role of exports in the
growth process. This was also the case in Hong Kong and
Singapore which already had high export-GDP ratios at the 
beginning of the period.
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Table 1.1 GDP per capita (US$)
At purchasing power parities 
prices
in 1980 At
exchange
rates
19881963 1973 1981 1988 1988/1963
Hong Kong 2 247 4 552 7 751 11 952 5.32 8 249
S.Korea 747 1 553 2 457 4 094 5.48 2 849
Singapore 1 777 3 838 6 308 11 693 6.58 7 623
Taiwan 980 1 976 3 028 4 607 4.70 4 804
Argentina 2 949 4 157 3 935 3 474 1 . 18 2 563
Brazil 1 400 2 338 3 252 3 424 2.45 2 305
Chile 3 231 3 502 4 443 3 933 1.22 1 492
Mexico 2 312 3 403 4 576 3 649 1 . 58 1 749
Indones ia 463 706 1 155 1 348 2.91 409
Malaysia 1 233 2 146 3 281 3 643 2.95 1 217
Phillipines 965 1 209 1 565 1 460 1.51 603
Thai land 537 761 1 096 1 627 3.03 887
Colombia 1 364 2 010 2 582 2 844 2.09 1 217
Jamaica 1 554 2 455 1 873 1 797 1.16 1 189
Peru 1 973 2 362 2 494 2 102 1.07 2 178
Venezuela 6 123 5 735 4 194 3 814 0.62 2 716
Source : World Bank , World Development Report, 1989
Explanation : Table 1.1 provides the data for the benchmark
years of the 1963-73 period of the world economic boom, the 
1973-81 period of two oil shocks, and the 1981-88 period of the 
debt crisis.
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Table 1.2 Export and Import shares
Export/GDP ratio Import/GDP ratio
1963 1973 1981 1987 1963 1973 1981 1987
Hong Kong N A 66.7 77 . 9 104.1 NA 74.4 83.9 104.1
S.Korea 2.3 23.2 30.8 39.0 14.6 31.2 37.9 33.8
Singapore 124.5 88.0 151.0 143.7 153.4 123.5 198.5 163.3
Taiwan 15 .3 42.1 47.6 56.6 16.7 35 . 6 44.7 36.5
Sources : GDP and exchange rate data are from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial
Export expansion in the NICs involved an increasing 
shift towards manufactured exports. In Taiwan, the share 
of manufactured goods in total exports rose from 38 % in
1963 to 91 % in 1987 \ in South Korea, the corresponding
figures were 45 % and 92 % [ see Table 1.3 ]. Smaller
changes occurred in Hong Kong, which already had a 92 % 
manufactured export share in 1963, and in Singapore, 
where entrepot trade in primary products was of
importance (Balassa 1991, 6).
Data on manufactured exports shares are affected by 
the availability of natural resources, especially oil. 
Per capita manufactured exports provides an indication of 
a country's success in these products. Table 1.4 shows 
rapid expansion of manufactured exports in the NICs. In 
1963, these were negligible in South Korea and Taiwan but 
reached $ 1035 per head and $ 2457 per head for the 
latter in 1987. The rate of expansion for Hong Kong and 
Singapore which started from a higher base was smaller.
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Savings and Investment
All East Asian NICs increased their domestic savings 
in the 1973-81 period. These increases were smaller and 
declined in others in the same period. At the same time 
NICs maintained higher levels of investment efficiency 
which is measured (however imperfectly by incremental 
capita 1-output ratios (iCORs) [see Table 1.5].
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Table 1.3 Commodity Composition of Exports (percent)
Nonfuel
Fuels primary Manufactures Other Total
1963
Hong Kong 0.0 7 . 8 91.7 0.5 100.0
S.Korea 3.0 51.8 45.1 0.2 100.0
Singapore 16.7 52.3 27.8 3.3 100.0
Taiwan 0.9 61.0 38.0 0.0 100.0
1973
Hong Kong NA 3.3 96 . 5 0.2 100.0
S.Korea 1 . 1 14.7 84.0 0.2 100.0
S ingapore 19.8 33.8 44.3 2.1 100.0
Taiwan 0.3 16.0 83.6 0.1 100.0
1981
Hong Kong 0.1 3.0 96 . 5 0.4 100.0
S.Korea 0.7 8.7 90.0 0.5 100.0
Singapore 27.3 16.8 48.2 7 . 7 100.0
Taiwan 1 . 9 9 . 2 88 . 7 0.1 100.0
1987
Hong Kong 0.3 2.9 95.6 1.3 100.0
S.Korea 1.5 6 . 1 92.4 0.0 100.0
S ingapore 15.6 12.6 66 . 1 5 . 5 100.0
Taiwan 0.8 7 , 5 91.6 0.2 100.0
Souces : UN, Commodi ty Trade Statistics , various issues.
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Table 1.4
Per capita exports of manufactured goods (US$, current)
1963 1973 1981 1985 1986 1987
Hong Kong 179.7 866.9 2664.7 2891.9 3414.6 4273.1
S.Korea 1 . 5 79.2 492.8 673.4 767.3 1035.3
Singapore 175.0 730.0 4139.0 4563.7 5136.2 7243.0
Taiwan 10.8 237.7 1110.8 1444.9 1848.5 2456.8
Sources : UN, COMTRADE data base.
-24-
GDP growth rates, domestic savings ratios, and the IGOR
Table 1.5
Country
GDP
growth
rate
Domesti c 
saving 
ratio
IGOR
1963-73
Hong Kong 8.9 24.3 3.6
S . Ko r e a 9.3 13.0 2.1
Singapore 10.3 16.5 3.1
Taiwan 11 . 1 24.4 1 . 9
1973-81
Hong Kong 9 . 1 29.0 3.4
S.Korea 7 . 8 23.6 4.2
Singapore 7.8 32.8 5.0
Taiwan 8.0 32.8 3.7
1981-87
Hong Kong 7.2 28.3 4.0
S.Korea 8.9 29.8 3.5
Singapore 5.3 42.0 8.4
Taiwan 7 . 6 33.7 2 . 9
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1987 .
Social Indicators
Data on social indicators should be used 
complementary to the information on economic growth rates 
to view the overall success of a country under a specific 
strategy.
a. Employment :
Data on employment are scarce. But Table 1.6 shows 
that manufacturing employment increased approximately 
fivefold in South Korea and Taiwan between 1963 and 1986, 
leading to a decline in the unemployment rate by 
approximately one half (International Labor Office, 
Yearbook of Labor Statistics).
By 1986 the rate of unemployment was 6.5 % in
Singapore, 2.8 % in Hong Kong, 3,8 % in South Korea and 
2.7 7o in Taiwan .
b. Health :
Between 1965-87, life expectancy among NICs 
increased mostly in Hong Kong and South Korea, By 1987 
the life expectancy was highest in Hong Kong (76 years), 
followed by Singapore and Taiwan (73 years). Infant 
mortality rates were most favorable in Taiwan (7/1000), 
followed by Hong Kong (8/1000) and Singapore (9/1000) 
having declined by two thirds during the preceding two 
decades. On the other hand, differences in the number of 
people per physician are considerable among the NICs [see 
Table 1.7 ] ( World Bank Development Report 1989 )
c. Education I
Education and skill level of the population are
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Table 1.6
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Employment and Unemployment
Index of manufacturing
employment
(1975=100)
1963 1973 1981 1986
Hong Kong NA 85.8 133.4 135.5
S.Korea 28.6 80.5 130.2 181.0
Singapore NA 87.1 155.0 133.0
Taiwan 36.3 93.5 141.4 172.2
Unemployment rate
(nonagricultural employment)
1963 1973 1981 1986
Hong Kong NA NA 4.6 2.8
S.Ko r e a 8.1 4.0 4.5 3.8
S ingapore NA 4.5 2.9 6 . 5
Taiwan 4.3 1.3 1.4 2.7
Source t International Labor Office, Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics, various issues
important determinants of the success of a population in 
manufacturing and industrialization. The literacy rate 
and secondary school enrollment thus is of importance for 
training of technical and highly skilled labor. By 
1986, the secondary school enrollment rate in South 
Korea was 95 % , in Hong Kong 69 % , in Singapore 71 %
and in Taiwan 88 % [for secondary school enrollment rates 
and literacy rates see Table 1.8].
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International Trade Indicators :
Superior economic performance of the NICs is also 
apparent in their trends of exports and imports. Between 
1963 and 1988, the share of the Pacific Area developing 
countries in the total exports of the LDCs rose from 11.8 
% to 41.8 % (IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics). The
share of imports of this group experienced a decline 
during the same period from 26.7 7o to 15.4 % .
Within the Pacific total, the NICs had a large 
expansion in their share of 8.1 % in world exports and
7.3 7o in world imports by 1988 compared with an export 
share of 1.6 % and import share of 2.2 % in 1963 when EP 
strategy was not implemented [see Table 1.9 and Table 
1.10].
According to the data analysis, by 1988 the GNP 
growth rates of the NICs were as follows *. Hong Kong 7,4 
% , Singapore 11.0 % , Taiwan 7.3 % , and South Korea
11.3%.
After examining the data on exports, GDP per capita.
Table 1.7
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Health Indicators
Life
expectancy
Infant
mortality
Population per 
physician
1965 1987 1965 1987 1965 1984
Hong Kong 66 76 28 8 2 460 1 070S.Korea 57 69 63 25 2 700 1 170Singapore 66 73 26 9 1 900 1 310Taiwan 67 73 24 7 1 819 1 260
Sources : World Bank, World Development Report, 1989.
Taiwanese data also from World Bank sources.
Table 1.8
Educational Indicators
EnrolIment EnrolIment
Literacy in secondary in higher
rate s chools educa t ion
(percent) (percent) (percent)
I960 1980 1965 1985 1965 1986
Hong Kong 70.4 77.3 29 69 5 13
S.Korea 70.6 87 . 6 35 95 6 33
Singapore 49.8 82.9 45 71 10 12
Taiwan 72.9 89.7 44 88 7 21
Sources : School enrollment data from World Bank, World
Development Report, 1989. Literacy rates from UNESCO, 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
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Table 1.9
Country composition of world exports (percent)
1963 1973 1981 1988
Developed Countries 64.7 76.2 63.8 71.1
- United States 15.0 13.5 12.2 11.6
- Western Europe 39.7 48.3 38.4 44.2
- Japan 3.5 7.0 7.9 9.6
- Canada, Australia, New Zealand 6.5 7.3 5.2 5.7
Developing Countries 22.8 22.6 31.0 24.9
Pacific Countries 2.7 4.9 7.1 10.4
- Hong Kong 0.6 1.0 1.1 2.3
- S.Korea 0.1 0.6 1.1 2.2
- Singapore 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.4
- Taiwan 0.2 0.8 1.2 2.2
~ Indonesia
- Malaysia
~ Philippines
- Thailand
- China
Other Developing Countries
- Other Asia
- Africa
- Europe
- Middle East
- Latin America
0.4 
NA 
0.5 
0.3
0.9
19
3
4 
0 
3
7.0
0 .6 
0 .6 
0.4 
0.3
0.8
16
0
4 
0 
6
5
1 . 2 
0.6 
0.3 
0.4
1 . 1
22.8 
1.0 
4.0 
0.8 
11.2 
5.8
0 .7 
0 .8 
0.3 
0 .6
1 . 7
1 2 . 8  
1 . 22
1
3
4
Sources : International Monetary Fund, Trade Statistics, various
issues .
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Table 1.10
Percentage of NIC imports in world imports
1963 1973 1981 1988
Hong Kong 0.8 1.0 1.2 2.2
S.Korea 0.3 0.8 1.3 1 . 8
Singapore 0.8 1.0 1.4 1 . 5
Taiwan 0.2 0.7 1 . 1 1 . 7
East Asian NICs 2.2 3.5 5.0 7.3
Source I International Monetary Fund, Trade Statistics, various
issues
domestic savings and investment, and social indicators it 
is apparent that during the period between 1963 and 1988, 
the NICs have achieved a high economic performance under 
the EP strategy. How did they manage to reach such high 
levels of economic performance, not only in income terms, 
but also in terms of social indicators ? In order to 
answer this question, the historical, social and 
political features unique to each of these four NICs 
should be examined with special emphasis on the policies 
applied and the way of implementation of the EP strategy.
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HONG KONG
Hong Kong has a population of 5.6 million and an 
area of 1052 km square . Before the Second World War it 
depended entirely on the entrepot trade. After the 
Japanese occupation and a further severe shock in mid- 
1951 when China entered the Korean War and the UN imposed 
an embargo on trade with China, the uncertainties in the 
political and economic environment led Hong Kong to 
undertake new activities in the manufacturing sector 
(Balassa 1991, 30).
Together with the entrepreneurial and technical 
skills and the labor force brought with the new arrivals 
from China, Hong Kong's manufacturing sector began to 
flourish. The existence of trade ties and the 
availability of an efficient network of transportation, 
communication, and banking facilities benefitted Hong 
Kong's manufacturing sector and it became an
international financial center in the latter part of the 
1970s .
Under a laissez-faire economy with free trade and 
free capital movements, the manufacturing activities 
further developed. But governmental policies also played 
an important role in providing political stability and 
economic conditions that have permitted market forces to 
stimulate late growth of manufacturing production and 
trade .
Government Policies :
Although Hong Kong's economy traditionally operates 
under a laissez-faire system, this orientation was a 
result of a deliberate choice. The government's actions 
supported the growth of manufacturing industries in the 
1960s, the Hong Kong Trade Development Council in 1966, 
the Hong Kong Productivity Council in 1967, and the Hong 
Kong Credit Insurance Corporation in 1968 (Turner 1982, 
18). The growth in manufactured exports was thus a 
deliberate national development strategy adopted by both 
the government and the private sector.
The Hong Kong government owns no manufacturing 
establishments, it does not subsidize exports, it applies 
no tariffs or import restrictions, and it does not 
attempt to influence the manufacturing sector's 
activities. Firms are established freely with few
regulations on their operations. In addition, there 
exists no minimum wage legislation and while the trade 
unions are free to.operate, their influence has been
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limited : only 7 % of industrial workers are unionized.
Taxes are low, income taxes range from 5 to 25 percent, 
corporate income taxes are at a total of 16.5 percent. 
While there exist reduced depreciation allowances for new 
investment, the government provides physical and social 
infrastructure for businesses. It has been involved in 
land reclamation, enlarged ports, built roads and 
highways. The government has also provided low-rent 
housing to about two fifths of the population. and 
subsidized education until 15 years of age (Balassa 1991, 
32) .
In Hong Kong, international financial transactions 
are completely free, contributing to the emergence of 
Hong Kong as a financial center. Restrictions are not 
imposed on foreign direct investment abroad by Hong Kong. 
There exists no Central Bank in Hong Kong.
The foundation of the operation of Hong Kong economy 
is composed of property rights and the contractual rights 
which are efficiently provided by the legal system of 
Hong Kong. The Former Attorney General of Hong Kong has
noted :
" It is the predictability and continuity of the 
economic and financial environment taken together 
with the commercial and social stability given by 
strict adherence to the Rule of Law which have been 
essential elements in creating the climate of 
success," (cited in Lethbridge 1984, 235).
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While creating such an environment, the Hong Kong 
government thus played upon an important role in four 
main areas : 1) controlling the monetary policy (largely
ineffectual in practice) ; 2) regulating the financial
sector (on minimal basis) ; 3) providing basic social
services ; 4) establishing industrial and economic
advisory boards (Baiassa 1991, 32).
Thus, Hong Kong's governmental policies aided 
greatly in creating a suitable environment for its 
economic growth and for the success of its EP strategy. 
Economic Growth :
Between 1963 and 1987 Hong Kong’s per capita income 
growth averaged 6.3 % . In 1988 it reached $ 8000 [see
Tables 1.1 and 2.1]. Growth originated in the
manufacturing sector and increasingly in services both of 
which were oriented towards exports, with exports of 
goods and services rising over 11  ^ a year between 1963
and 1987 ( World Bank ) .
Economic growth was also supported by a high rate of 
investment [see Table 2.2] which rose to 36 % in the
1980s financed largely by domestic savings. Foreign 
savings assumed importance in the late 1970s and early 
1980s when investment activity was at its peak. In the 
mean time, the rapid rise in exports helped correct the 
trade deficit of Hong Kong especially after the
establishment of a fixed exchange rate in 1985 which gave 
Hong Kong a competitive edge.
-34-
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HONG KONG :
Table 2.1
Economic performance indicators of Hong Kong
Growth rates 1963-73 1973-81 1981-7 1963-87
GDP 8.9 9 . 1 7.2 8.5
Population 2.1 2.6 1.3 2.1
GDP per capita 6.7 6.3 5 . 8 6.3
Inves tment 4.1 12.0 2.1 6 . 1
Manufac. production “ “
Agricul. production *
Exports 11 . 1 10.5 13.4 11.5
Impo r t s 9.8 11.8 11.7 11.0
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1987,
Table 2.2
Savings and investment ratios of Hong Kong (percent of GDP)
1973 1975 1977 1979
Private savings 
Domestic savings 
Foreign savings 
Domestic investment
Private savings 
Domestic savings 
Foreign savings 
Domestic investment
2 6 . 4 2 5 . 3 3 0 . 3 3 1 . 1
- 2 ,5 - 1 . 0 - 2 . 3 2 .9
2 4 . 0 2 4 . 2 2 7 . 9 3 4 . 0
1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7
3 0 . 4 2 5 . 1 2 7 . 3 3 0 . 7
5 . 6 2 . 0 - 5  . 7 - 5 . 4
3 6 . 0 2 7 . 1 2 1 . 7 2 5 . 3
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1987.
In the presence of little arable land, resources and 
a small domestic market Hong Kong has thus made a 
deliberate choice of implementing the EP strategy and 
aiding the manufacturing sector for the production of 
export goods necessary to earn foreign exchange to import 
their needs.
SINGAPORE
Within an area of 618 km square , Singapore has a 
population of 2.6 million. After becoming independent in 
1959, Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 
for two years (Balassa 1991, 73). Before independence,
the economy was dominated by entrepot trade. The
financial skills, communications and distributional 
skills associated with entrepot functions made Singapore 
alert to the developments in the world economy.
After an initial period of Import Substitution (IS)
with high protection, due to the small domestic market's
inability to lead to high standards of" living under
protection, exports were given priority. In contrast to 
other NICs foreign direct investment played an important 
role in Singapore's industrial development. Foreign 
direct investment was encouraged by incentives while 
domestic capital concentrated on trading and finance.
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Government Policies :
After the Second World War, due to a decline in the 
entrepot trade (importing minerals, lumber, and rubber
from Malaysia and Indonesia for re-export after 
processing), and the consequent rise in unemployment , 
industrialization became Singapore's primary objective.
According to People’s Action Party's (PAP) Manifesto 
in 1959, Singapore had advantages that could be useful in 
industrialization, such as : hardworking, resourceful,
enterprising people ; favorable geographical position and 
sea communications ; large amount of capital accumulated 
by local enterprise and public authotities ; and markets 
available in the region (People's Action Party, 1958).
After separation from the Malaysian Federation, 
the government implemented a policy of IS, but in 1965 
when Malaysia reimposed tariffs and quotas on Singapore's 
manufactured goods, Singapore adopted a conscious policy 
of Export Promotion. Specific measures were taken to 
liberalize restrictions and duties on imported inputs for 
export production and to attract foreign investment and 
technology.
Export subsidies were introduced and tax measures 
were adopted to favor profits and expenses associated 
with manufacturing exports. Company tax rates on profits 
earned from exports, tax on royalties, licences, 
technical assistance fees were reduced. Tax allowances 
were provided for the development of markets abroad ( 
Tuna 1989 , 32) .
To complement the manufacturing sector and to aid in 
industrialization efforts, the Singapore government 
established a Technical Education Department in 1968
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placing emphasis on technical education and providing 
overseas training. In 1975, the Export Credit Insurance 
Corporation was established with 50 % government
participation to insure exports against defaults on 
commercial and political grounds (Chen 1983, 35).
In 1978, the government launched a program termed 
"Second Industrial Revolution" to increase the relative 
importance of high technology industries through 
incentives for investment in Research & Development 
with a policy of raising wages, educational, training 
facilities (Rodan 1985, 40).
Economic Growth :
With the contribution of the policies applied, under 
the EP strategy, Singapore experienced rapid economic 
growth. Between 1963 and 1988 per capita income rose by 
a factor of 6.65 reaching $ 7623 a year [see Table 1.1]. 
Later on, however there was a slowdown in economic growth 
over time [see Table 3.1].
Economic growth was concentrated in the 
manufacturing and financial sectors. ,.The share of 
manufacturing in GDP rose from 12.6 % in 1963 to 28.6 % 
in 1987. Exports rose parallel to the increase in the 
share of manufacturing in GDP.
Investment I
In Singapore investment was supported by the 
government, public institutions, and directly by foreign 
sources [see Table 3.2].
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SINGAPORE 
Table 3.1
Economic performance indicators of Singapore (percent)
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Growth rates 1963-73 1973-81 1981-7 1963-87
GDP 10.3 7.8 5.3 8.2
Populat ion 2.0 1.4 1 . 1 1.6
GDP per capita 8.1 6.4 4.1 6 .5
Inves tment 15.6 8.7 3.4 10.1
Manufac.product ion 15.8 8.3 3.8 10.2
Agr icul.production 4.3 0.8 -5 . 1 0.7
Exports
Imports
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1988 .
Table I 3.2
Savings and investment ratios of Singapore (percent of GDP)
1973 1975 1977 1979
Private savings 28.8 28.4 31.8 33.7
Domestic savings 28 . 7 29.3 32.9 36.0
Foreign savings 10.0 10.5 2.6 7.0
Domestic investment 38.7 39.8 35.4 42.9
1981 1983 1985 1987
Private savings 40.4 43.8 38.2
Domestic savings 41.1 45.6 40.3 40.1
Foreign savings 5.6 1.8 2.4 -0.4
Domestic investment 46.7 47.4 42.8 39.7
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1988.
The Development Bank of Singapore was established 
with 49 % government participation in order to finance 
development . In addition, by 1984, the public sector 
accounted for 33.4 Z of gross capital formation and 
generated 69 % of gross national savings (cited in Krause 
1987, 110).
Beside governmental efforts to raise investment, 
foreign direct investment also had a major role in making 
funds available for industrialization. The promotion of 
direct foreign investment was initially undertaken to 
increase employment which was 46,000 in 1958 (Balassa 
1991, 58). The major policy instrument designed to 
attract foreign direct investment was tax incentives. 
The provision of industrial finance and the establishment 
of industrial estates further attracted foreign 
investment. Most importantly, there exist in Singapore 
free repatriation of profits, dividends and capital and 
no disincentives for foreign direct investment which is 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector.
Thus, with the support of governmental policies and 
domestic and foreign investment Singapore made a 
successful transition into industrialization, increased 
its volume of manufactured exports, and with the outward- 
oriented Export Promotion strategy Singapore achieved 
high growth rates.
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TAIWAN
With an area of 36.000 km square and a population of 
19.5 million, Taiwan has few mineral resources and 
insufficient arable land compared with its population. 
After the Second World War when Chiang Kai-Shek withdrew 
to Taiwan, Taiwan benefited from American aid which 
supported its IS program.
In the early 1960s Taiwan adopted an outward- 
oriented EP strategy for development as the IS strategy 
ran into difficulties due to the limitations of small 
domestic market. The EP strategy in Taiwan involved 
providing export incentives and liberalizing imports in 
order to remove discrimination against exports from the 
economic system.
Between 1965 and 1975 Taiwan experienced a real GDP 
growth of 10.6 Z ; no deterioration of income
distribution; and improvement in literacy and life
expectancy higher than most other developing countries. 
There were increases in real manufacturing earnings of 
15 % a year from 1960 to 1979 ; and unemployment at less
than 2 % since 1970 (Wade 1988 , 30).
According to Balassa, in Taiwan growth has been 
accompanied with EQUITY. Taiwan had one of the most
equitable distribution of income among LDCs following the 
land reform of the late 1940s and 1950s which further 
improved after the adoption of an outward-oriented
development strategy (Balassa 1991, 96).
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Since the late 1960s this transformation occurred 
without balance of payments problems, rapid inflation and 
without high levels of foreign borrowing. According to 
Wade, this is not a case of easy natural resource 
exploitation but of labor-intensive manufacturing. In 
1973 the share of manufacturing in GDP was 36 %, which is 
high even by the standards of industrialized countries. 
With a small domestic market, a large part of the 
manufactured production has been exported (Wade 1988,30).
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Government Policies :
Many leaders doubted that Taiwan’s light industries 
could become internationally competitive while adopting 
the EP strategy. Moreover, the EP strategy challenged 
the interests of the military who wanted to develop heavy 
industries, and of bureaucrats who were forced to yield 
much of their direct power over the economy (Clark 1989, 
174) .
The Republic of China (R.O.C.), thus, adopted
several policies in the late 1950s and early 1960s aiming 
at promoting exports, domestic investment and 
industrialization. This new policy package provided a 
variety of incentives for exporting, such as : a) more
realistic exchange rates ( the dual exchange rate was 
abolished, the currency was depreciated ), b) cheap 
credit and rebates on imported components and raw 
materials, c) tax reform and decreased regulation 
encouraging private i n v e s tme n t / en-t e r p r i s e and foreign
investment, d) liberalized trade system for import of 
industrial components, and e) reduction in tariffs and 
other import restrictions (Clark 1989, 175).
In addition to the above mantioned incentives, a 
large package of selective fiscal incentives for both 
domestic and foreign investors was established. On the 
other hand, the industrial parks established by the 
government provided infrastructural facilities and 
enabled investors to rent rather than to buy land and 
buildings (Wade 1988, 34).
Thus, between 1966 and 1976 , the number of 
manufacturing firms increased by 150 % in Taiwan and the 
industrial production rose by 18 % a year over the 1963- 
73 period (Clark 1989 175).
Apart from the industrial policies, the government's 
educational efforts also contributed to the industrial 
development of Taiwan by enhancing the skill level of the 
labor force. In 1940 Taiwan's literacy rate was Z 21. 
After the Second World War, illiteracy was eradicated and 
secondary school enrollment rate became 88 Z (Balassa 
1991, 104).
Reforms on the financial sector in the 1960s also 
contributed to economic growth and development. The 
reform involved setting high interest rates with a view 
to evening out the demand for and the supply of funds. 
This policy had a favorable influence on savings as well 
as on the allocation of savings among alternative 
investment.
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Economic Growth :
In 1963, Taiwan’s per capita income was lower than 
Brazil’s and it was less than one third of that of Chile 
and Argentina. By 1988, however, Taiwan surpassed all 
these countries by a considerable margin [see Table 1.1]. 
Per capita income growth averaged 6.8 % in the 1963-87
period and 6.1 % a year between 1981 and 1987 [see Table 
4.1] .
The stimulus for the economic growth was provided by 
exports which increased 17.4 % a year between 1963 and 
1987. As a result the share of export goods and services 
reached 60.7 Z of the GDP in 1987 compared with 17.8 Z in 
1963 (World Bank). The economic growth was concentrated 
in the manufacturing sector.
Investment :
In the early part of the period between 1963 and 
1973, domestic investment increased very rapidly by 17,4 
Z a year. However, after 1981, investment increased very 
little and the share of investment in GDP tell to 20 Z in 
1987 [see Table 4.2]. Savings that originate in the 
private sector financed the investment.
Foreign Aid :
Some scholars attribute Taiwan’s success to foreign 
aid (Jacoby 1966, 45). However, during the 1950s foreign
aid in Taiwan accounted for 5-7 Z of GNP and financed a 
substantial proportion of imports (Balassa 1991, 104).
During 1960s the effects of foreign aid declined. 
Overall direct foreign investment never contributed more
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TAIWAN
Table 4.1
Economic performance indicators of Taiwan (percent)
Growth rates 1963-73 1973-81 1981-7 1963-87
GDP 11.1 8.0 7.6 9.2
Population 2.8 2.0 1.4 2.2
GDP per caita 8.1 5.9 6 .1 6.8
Investment 17.4 9.6 1 . 7 10.7
Manufac.production 18 . 6 9.3 9 . 1 13.1
Agricul.production 3.8 1.4 1.3 2.4
Exports 25 . 5 10.4 13.9 17.4
Imports 21.4 9.4 10.1 14.4
Source : World Bank, World Development Report , 1987,1988.
Table 4.2
Savings and investment ratios of Taiwan (percent of GDP)
1973 1975 1977 1979
Private savings . 28.4 25.9 32.7
Domestic savings 34.6 27.3 33.3 34.5
Foreign savings -5.3 3.3 -4.9 -1 . 1
Domestic investment 29.3 30.6 28.4 33.3
1981 1983 1985 1987
Private savings 32.6 33.1 32.3 38.5
Domestic savings 32.4 32.0 32.3 38.8
Foreign savings -2.1 -9.0 -14.5 -19.2
Domestic investment 30.3 23.0 17.9 19.6
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1987.
than 10 Z of total manufacturing investment. Because of 
the uncertain political and economic status of the 
island, foreign investment did not begin to flow into 
Taiwan until early 1960s. By that time domestic
industrialization was well underway and the 
denationalization and foreign domination had became 
difficult to achieve. In addition , the regime with its 
memories of foreign enclaves was quite sensitive to the 
need of controlling the MNCs (Clark 1989, 185 ).
Nevertheless, MNCs made a major contribution to the 
upgrading of some industries such as microelectronics and 
in the marketing of Taiwan's exports.
Use of The Comparative Advantage :
The fact that the labor-intensive industries 
displayed the fastest growth implies that Taiwan had been 
able to find a place in the global economy based on its 
comparative advantage based on low-cost labor. However, 
despite this general emphasis on low-cost production, in 
the 1960s small and medium industries became more capital 
intensive as entrepreneurs upgraded their production 
techniques.
In addition, during the EP boom of 1963-73, the 
state exercised its considerable power actively to 
promote its chosen pattern of expansion which included 
development of heavy and chemical industries as well as 
the export sector (Wade 1988, 45 ). Here, the aim was to
change Taiwan's comparative advantage in the anticipation 
of changing market conditions , and thus to permit a
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steadily more differentiated range of export products.
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SOUTH KOREA
South Korea with a population of 42 million and an 
area of 98.000 km square, has a mountainous terrain 
unsuitable for agriculture (Balassa 1991, 46). In the
late 1950s and early 1960s South Korean industrialization 
first emphasized Import Substitution. But policymakers 
changed the strategy as they realized the limits imposed 
by the small market size and the lack of natural 
resources (Tuna 1989, 32).
Following the election of Chung Нее Park in 1964, 
major policy changes were undertaken as a part of an 
export-oriented growth strategy. Reforms included
unrestricted access to intermediate and capital goods 
imports, a uniform exchange rate, tax exemptions for 
exporters, reduced prices on inputs and access to credit 
for investment.
As a result exports rose to 45 % of the GDP in 1987 
from that of 3 % of GDP in 1960. Investment also 
increased from 11 % of GDP in 1960 to 30 % .of GDP in 1987 
[see Tables 1.1, 5.1 and 5.2].
Government Policies :
Reforms of 1964 thus involved devaluation,
unification of exchange rates, import liberalization, and 
increased incentives for exports. In 1965, these
incentives were extended to indirect exports and 
exporters were also given increased credit preferences.
SOUTH KOREA 
Table 5.1
Economic performance indicators of South Korea (percent)
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Growth rates 1973-63 1973-81 1981-7 1963-87
GDP 9.3 7.8 8.9 8.7Population 2.4 1.6 1.4 1.9GDP per capita 6.8 6.1 7.4 6.7
Inves tment 14.4 11.2 10.2 12.3Manufac.product ion 19.8 13.0 11.5 15.4
Agricul.production 4.1 2.3 2.4 3.1
Exports 33.6 14.3 13.8 21.8
Impo r t s 18.8 12.2 9 . 9 14.3
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1987 .
Table 5.2
Savings and investment ratios of South Korea (Percent of GDP)
1973 1975 1977 1979 1980
Private savings 22.2 20.4 29.0 29.8 25 . 5
Domestic savings 21.7 18.5 27.2 28.1 23.3
Foreign savings 2.7 8.5 -0.2 7 . 2 7 . 8
Domestic investment 24.6 27.0 27.0 35.3 31.1
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1987 .
Apart from the price incentives, the government sponsored 
Korea Trade Promotion Association (KOTRA) was founded in 
1964 to promote Korean exports and to carry out market 
research abroad (Balassa 1991, 48).
Adoption of the EP strategy was accompanied by the 
reform of financial system. Interest rates were raised 
to increase financial savings. In the subsequent years 
as policy changes occurred in favor of capital intensive 
industries producing intermediate goods and heavy 
machinery, these industries were given priority in the 
allocation of domestic credit.
Until 1966 Korean policy discouraged foreign 
investment and borrowing. But as a result of decreased 
aid flows, the government reversed its stance and began 
to encourage private inflows, which were still carefully 
controlled.
In all these efforts the export drive was central. 
President Park chaired joint meetings of government 
officials and businessmen each month, in which export 
performance was reviewed industry by industry (Krueger 
1987, 190). In addition, the systematic nature of the
Korean government's reforms and its commitment to the EP 
strategy provided the necessary assurance to exporters to 
take risks associated with exporting (Turner 1982, 19).
During the oil crisis of 1973-74 Korea modified its 
strategy and policies. The real exchange rate was 
adjusted promptly together with adjustments in the 
domestic tax rates to offset the impact on low-income
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groups (Krueger 1987, 192).
Assassination of President Park led to further 
policy changes in 1980. The consequent Fifth Five Year 
Plan and Sixth Five Year Plan ( 1987-91) contributed to 
the process of import liberalization together with 
financial liberalization measures such as
denationalization of commercial banks and abolition of 
credit ceilings.
Education :
An important factor in Korea’s ability to exploit 
the advantages of the EP strategy has been education. The 
promotion of technology was given priority. Several 
institutions has been established to train scientists, 
engineers and to conduct research. With the introduction 
of compulsory education after the war, there occurred 
considerable expansion in secondary and higher education. 
While in 1965 35 % of population was enrolled in the 
secondary school, by 1985 this figure reached to 95 % 
(Balassa 1991, 55).
Government-Business Relationship :
The government-business relationship in South Korea 
also contributed greatly to economic growth and 
development. The government together with large private 
enterprises constituted an internal organization, named 
QUASI-INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (Lee 1992, 187). This
organization not only helped in effectively allocating 
resources and credit but also made it possible for the 
government to implement its developmental policies
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effectively. For example, enterprises would be favored 
with preferential loans as long as they achieved the 
export targets assigned by the government.
Another distinguishing characteristic of the Korean 
industry has been the importance of conglomerates, the 
CHAEBOL. The largest fifty-five firms account for more 
than one-third of industrial output (Balassa 1991, 49).
Industrial concentration was helpful in providing the 
economies of scale in production and in foreign sales as 
well as name recognition abroad. In addition, the
comparatively small number of conglomerates made it 
easier for the government to impose its will on firms. 
Economic Growth :
The governmental policies applied under the EP 
strategy led to rapid economic growth in Korea, Between 
1963 and 1988, per capita incomes increased fivefold 
reaching $ 2849 per head [see Table 1.1]. As a result
Korea now ranks among the higher middle-income countries.
Between 1963 and 1973 GDP increased at a rate of 
9.3 % , 8.2 % between 1973-81 and 8.9 % between 1981-87
[see Table 5.1] Economic growth was concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector and was promoted by the rapid 
expansion of exports and investment supported by domestic 
savings [see Tables 5.2 ]
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TOWARD AN EXPLANATION :
After adopting the EP strategy and implementing 
outward-looking development policies accordingly, the 
East Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South
Korea) have reached high economic growth levels and have 
continued to be the most dynamic exporters of 
manufactures. These four countries and the way they 
implemented the EP strategy provide a good example for
understanding how a trade policy can lead a country
towards economic growth. Here, the questions to be asked 
are : Why were the NICs able to export manufactured goods
in large volumes and to achieve remarkably high growth 
rates while other countries who also adopted the same 
trade strategy could not ? Will other LDCs who adopt the 
same trade strategy also become important exporters of 
manufactures in the world trade as they begin to
industrialize ?
One explanatory view is that the industrialization 
process is a historical spread in which the NICs are a 
part of the changing world economic structure parallel to 
the shifts in the international division of labor. 
Therefore, the number of NICs are expected to increase as 
industrialized countries vacate intermediate sectors in 
industrial production and advanced developing countries 
move into these sectors. In turn, advanced developing 
countries would vacate more basic industrial sectors in 
which the next tier of developing countries have a 
relative advantage (Tuna 1989, 30).
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According to authors such as Vogel and Balassa, 
however^ the success and the emergence of NICs result 
from a process of concentration of industrial capacity 
and special circumstances in certain countries that make 
high-volume , dynamic expansion of countries possible. 
In other words, the NICs have been successful under the 
EP strategy due to the coming together of several special 
factors together with an industrial capacity. What 
supports this view is the fact that only few LDCs have 
been as successful in exporting manufactures on a 
significant scale after adopting the EP strategy. Indeed 
certain factors common to these four countries might have 
been influential in their success with the EP strategy 
(Balassa 1991, Vogel 1991).
a) Physical and Geographical Characteristics :
The nature of their physical characteristics, 
geographical location, and history of the NICs require 
that they engage in trade in manufactures as there 
appears to be little economic alternative. They lack in 
natural resources ; their arable land provides little 
food supply ; and the size of their domestic markets 
tends to be inadequate to serve as the initial base for 
industrialization. Therefore, their existence depends on 
their ability to earn foreign exchange by exporting goods 
and services to the regional and world markets (Geiger 
and Geiger 1973, 8).
In addition, the financial and the distributional 
skills related with·their historical entrepot functions
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(in the case of Hong Kong and Singapore) and their 
colonial experience and new skilled labor force (in the 
case of Taiwan and South Korea) made the NICs alert to 
the developments in the world economy. This facilitated 
their transition to manufacturing centers focused on 
export markets through skilled and holistic
implementation of the EP strategy,
b) Political Survival :
For all four NICs political survival was closely 
tied to economic development. While Singapore is a 
predominantly Chinese city-state floating in the sea of 
Malays, Hong Kong is "a borrowed place on borrowed time 
” always aware of the weight of China so close in hand 
(Shibusawa 1992, 67). Similarly, Taiwan is ever
conscious of the ’threat” from mainland China while South 
Korea is another part-country which has never felt any 
real affinity with its Northern neighbour, China.
Thus, the nearby external threat which was perceived 
as real led to a sense of competition and a consensus 
that development was essential.
c) Population :
All four NICs are densely populated and poorly 
endowed with natural resources. As a result, they have
to rely not only on imported raw materials but also on 
making the best use of their human resources through 
education in order to achieve an efficient and well 
qualified labor force.
d) Confucian Heritage :
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Because all four of these societies share a 
Confucian heritage, intellectuals who admire the East 
Asian tradition may find appealing the notion that the 
key to success lies in Confucianism. Many of these
intellectuals might also be influenced by the intriguing 
parallel between the Protestant ethic that supported 
Western capitalism and the Confucian ethic that helped to 
breed East Asian industrialization (Vogel 1991, 83).
However, many countries have achieved industrial 
transformation without Confucianism and many others are 
on the way to do so. Therefore, there exist inadequate 
evidence to believe that Confucian tradition has played a 
key role in the NICs* economic success.
Furthermore, the heartland of Confucianism has not 
yet achieved industrial transformation. If Confucianism 
alone explains why countries modernize, why should the 
Confucian motherland lag behind ? In addition, in East 
Asia industrialization prospered in areas far from the 
centers of traditional Confucian orthodoxy where trade 
and commerce were most highly developed (Vogel 1991, 84).
Therefore, although these points do not discredit 
arguments about the merits of Confucianism, they require 
us to consideration to other factors,
e) US Aid :
Although foreign aid should not be considered as the 
sole source of success in a country's industrialization 
and economic growth, in most cases foreign financial aid 
benefits a country's development efforts greatly. East
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Asian nations received aid from the US and from the 
industrial organizations which gave them extensive 
opportunities for contact with knowledgab1e foreigners. 
These were mostly Americans who became tutors not only in 
modern technology and management, but also in broader 
aspects of industrial society. According to Vogel, from 
this respect through appropriate advice and training 
Americans were perhaps even more crucial than the 
financial, military, and technical aid (Vogel 1991, 85).
Throughout the Cold War, since East Asian countries 
were in the front line of the battle against Communism, 
Americans made a high level of commitment to East Asia 
and offered technical advice and assistance in almost 
every sphere of life especially to Taiwan and South 
Korea. Singapore and Hong Kong received less direct US 
aid, but benefited from the stimulus their economies 
received in offering services to the allied troops during 
the Korean and Vietnam wars.
However, by the end of the 1960s US aid declined 
substantially and the leaders of NICs became further 
convinced that to defend themselves, both economically 
and militarily, they had to acquire a strong industrial 
base.
f) Labor Force :
A new labor force, eager to work and improve its 
skills to meet the needs of the industry is another 
factor that helped in the NICs success with the EP 
strategy.. By the time industrialization began each of
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these countries had a large dislocated population from 
North Korea, China, Malaysia, and Singapore that was 
anxious to find a new basis for economic livelihood. 
Being an uprooted elite group, these people provided a 
coherent core of creative leadership during 
industrialization .
In addition, the internal migration from rural to 
urban areas as a result of mechanization in agriculture 
further increased the number of workers eager to work and 
develop skills and careers,
g) The Japanese Model :
All of the four NICs shared a substantial heritage, 
geographical closeness and a history of commercial 
relations with Japan. While South Korea and Taiwan had 
the broadest base for understanding Japan due to the 
length of their Japanese occupation, Hong Kong and 
Singapore had been headquarters of Japanese troops and 
experienced a forced intimate contact with Japan.
When they began to industrialize, the NICs had 
available the Japanese model and Japanese technology and 
investment. The NICs carefully examined the Japanese 
model and how its labor-intensive industries' exports 
provided Japan with foreign exchange to buy new equipment 
and upgrade technology. The NICs also saw the crucial 
role of the Japanese government in guiding the industrial 
and economic changes.
In a sense, Japan has acted as a mentor to the four 
NICs - it has been either the first or the second large
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source of imports and of investment for all the NICs 
(Shibusawa 1991, 68). It has also become, the main
supplier to the NICs of intermediate components for 
consumer and communication products destined for the US.
h) The Role of the Government :
The role of the government remains a controversial 
factor, but in at least three of the NICs concrete 
economic performance became the hallmark of political 
legitimacy and national progress. Apart from Hong Kong 
where the government pursues a policy of ’^positive non- 
interventionism” and acts as a facilitator, the
government played a strong role in the planning and
implementation of the development policies (Shibusawa 
1991, 68).
Governments of the NICs have been very active in the 
implementation of the EP strategy and during
industrialization, not only through a commitment to 
development planning but also through close relations 
with industry.
All NICs are market economies, in the sense that the 
initiative rests mainly with the enterprise and profit 
remains the enterprise's main motive. However, in NICs 
the state tries to get things done by influencing the 
market, by shifting the composition of what is 
profitable, rather than by direct regulation or
production. The means of production are mostly privately 
owned and profits are mostly privately appropriated. 
However, the market rationality in the NICs is
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constrained by the priorities of industrialization. 
Industrialization per se has been the main aim, not
considerations of maximising profitability based on
current comparative advantage (White 1988, 6). For this
purpose governments have intervened aggresively in parts 
of the market to bring about specific allocative effects.
The role of the state has thus been predominant in
all of the NICs . In each case, the impact of the
governmental policies extended far beyond economic policy 
to include ideological mobilisation, pervasive and 
political controls. Each state has sought to draw a 
clear line between international and domestic economies 
and to define and implement national economic priorities 
through different forms of strategic planning (White 
1988, 24).
i) Commitment to Public Policy :
Another distinguishing feature of the four NICs is 
that they ail made a historical shift in public policy at 
a critical point in time to an export-oriented strategy 
which made manufactured exports the focus of the economic 
policy and development strategy (Tuna 1989, 34). What
makes this shift in public policy so important in the 
case of NICs is their commitment to the export-oriented 
growth which entails a holistic and internally consistent 
shift in the entire range of relevant economic policies. 
According to Turner :
” It is this commitment and the integrated use 
of various policy instruments to implement it 
that has enabled these countries to become 
significant exporters of manufactures on a
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global scale. There are numerous examples of 
countries maintaining realistic exchange rates 
without sufficient incentives on either the 
import or export side to achieve high export 
growth (Kruger 1978, 212). There are also 
examples of countries maintaining liberalized 
trade and payments regimes without sufficient 
export incentives to yield significant results 
(Krueger 1978, 283). But there are very few 
countries which have been able to implement an 
export-oriented groeth strategy holistically 
and with consistency among the salient policy 
instruments,’* (Turner 1982 , 21).
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j) Political Stability :
An important condition for the success of the EP 
strategy is that the shift in trade strategy is seen to 
be permanent, providing certainty and stability in order 
to elicit a sizable response from the investors and 
exporters. This ability to provide assurances derives 
from the capacity to sustain the policy over the long 
run, which is a characteristic of authoritarian rather 
than democratic regimes.
Authoritarian regimes have a greater possibility of 
achieving both the integration of various elements of 
policy into a coherent strategy and the implementation of 
the policy over the long run (Turner 1982, 22).
According to Don Keesing, governments that have succeeded 
in instituting coherent, pro-trade policies are not 
exactly repression-free, anti authoritarian regimes. Don 
Keesing continues : '*Having labor leaders in jail as well
as achieving enough political stability to take a long 
run view seem to be a very common accompaniments to the 
creation of protrade policies ” (Keesing 1979, 152).
In East Asia, the success of both capitalist and
socialist models of development depends heavily on a 
degree of political authorianism, at least during the 
early stages (White 1978, 24). Therefore, the political
stability coming from the authoritarian regime might be 
another factor which contributed to the holistic 
implementation of the EP policy and the success in export 
production and economic growth in the NICs.
Thus, the NIC success with the EP strategy seems to 
be the result of the unusual convergence of a variety of 
factors and circumstances. Geographical and physical 
location ; the need for political survival under 
percieved ’threats*' : populational and traditional
characteristics ; US aid and the Japanese model have all 
been influencial factors in forming the infrastructure 
and the derive required for industrialization under EP 
strategy. However, more essential elements necessary for 
a successful export drive tend to be a) the commitment by 
the government to an export-oriented strategy based on 
manufactures, b) holistic, rather than partial 
implementation of the strategy, involving consistent 
exchange-rate, import and export policies, and 3) 
political stability to ensure the implementation of 
these policies over a sustained period of time (Tuna 
1989, 36).
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Can the East Asian Model be Generalized ?
Can all LDCs following the EP strategy industrialize
and achieve the export and growth levels of the NICs ? Or 
do they face a special phenomenon which only a few
countries in any given period in history will be able to 
undertake and sustain ?
William Cline (1984) and Gustav Ranis (1985) provide 
opposing answers to these questions· Cline examines 
wheter the EAST Asian NIC model can be generalized 
without violating plausible constraints on the absorptive 
capacity of industrial country markets. He asks what 
would happen to protection if all LDCs tried to emulate 
the East Asian NICs and reach the same intensity of
manufactured exports. Cline argues that while individual 
developing countries might thrive by doing so, in the 
aggregate they would face sharp protective resistance to 
the flow of exports.
His analysis based on cross country patterns
relating manufactured exports to GDP as a function of 
development level (per capita income ) and country size 
(population), indicate that generalization of the East 
Asian model across all LDCs would make' LDC exports 
vulnerable to probable protective action in the face of 
flood of exports. Therefore, Cline suggests that the
development planners adopting the EP strategy must 
consider the probable capacity of the international 
market to absorb the resulting increases in exports from 
their own and like-minded developing countries.
According to Cline, NICs took the advantage of the 
open economy strategy before the export field became
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crowded with competition from the other LDCs and when the 
world economy was in a phase of prolonge bouyancy (Cline 
1984, 214).
On the other hand, according to Ranis, Cline 
misrepresents the nature of the choice facing policy 
makers and academics who urge the emulation of the Gang 
of Four model (Ranis 1985 , 544). He argues that for
different LDCs with different initial conditions (eg.
endowment, size, pouiation) and starting at different 
positions, emulation does not mean '^exporting as much as 
possible” but, rather, moving in the direction of
liberalization. He argues that Cline does not pay
attention to the differential time phased arrival of 
exports on world markets or to the diversified nature of 
exports from LDCs (Ranis 1985, 544). In addition. Ranis 
points out to Cline's neglect of the fact that
manufactured exports can be directed to the markets in 
the South as well as in the North.
Thus, there exist varying views on the question of 
generalization of the East Asian model,,, that is the
implementation of EP in the NICs. Comparing the
implementation of the EP in another country who could not 
reach similarly high growth rates might be beneficial 
in better understanding the NIC experience.
The next chapter will examine Turkey's experience 
with the EP policy based on an outward-oriented 
development strategy. The aim of the next chapter is to 
answer the question of why Turkey could not reach the
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growth rates and economic success similar to that of NICs 
although it also adopted the Export Promotion strategy.
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III.EXPORT PROMOTION IN PRACTICE: THE TURKISH PERFORMANCE
-65-
This chapter is an effort to examine the EP practice 
in Turkey in order to better understand the NIC
phonemenon and relate the case of Turkey to the EP
theory. Will an outward-oriented strategy work in
Turkey? How succesful were the economic reforms of the 
1980's ? In what ways does the Turkish performance under
the EP strategy differ from the NICs ' performance ? And 
what are the reasons for the relatively lower economic 
growth and success rates of the Turkish economy when 
compared with the NICs ?
To answer these questions satisfactorily, this
chapter includes a brief historical, economic background 
of Turkey together with the examination of the economic 
reforms of the 1980s, and the statistical indicators of 
economic performance. The chapter will examine the 
implementation of the EP strategy in Turkey and will
question the reasons for its relatively lower rate of 
success when compared with other countries who also
employed the same strategy.
Within an area of 780.576 km square, Turkey has a 
population of 55.9 million. After the Turkish War of
Liberation against the imperialist forces Kemal Atatürk 
proclaimed the Turkish Republic in October 1923. The
semi-colonial status of the Ottoman Empire and the recent 
threat to the very existence of the state made the 
leaders very sensitive to issues of political and
economic independence.
The misfortunes of the past, caused by domestic 
autocracy combined with corruption and inefficiency, and 
by growing foreign interference and dependency, were 
behind Ataturk's determination to draw a definite line 
between the imperial past and a modern republican, 
independent future (Z.Y. Hershlag 1988, ix). From the 
very start it was made quite clear that the national 
leadership was determined to secure free use of the 
national resources of the country without tolerating any 
interference from outside.
The official economic policy, etatism, which meant 
state-sponsored and directed economic development in the 
Turkish context, was established mostly on an industrial 
base, expressing itself in terms of self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency. Whatever new centers of economic
activity were created, as well as those that already 
existed, were to be in national hands (Tuna 1988, 135).
Turkey’s isolationist economic policies during the 
1930s including measures of control of foreign trade and 
foreign exchange transactions were a reaction against the 
experiences of the previous century. High tariff
barriers, economic autarky, and a drive for heavy 
industry and national economic self-sufficiency, were all 
the instruments which nationalist bureaucrats believed to 
be the only way of preventing the placement of public 
utilities under the control of foreign debt 
administration - as was the case before the falling of
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the Ottoman Empire (Barchard 1985, 11).
M.M.Finefrock points out that in 1933 Turkey became 
the very first of what we now call '^ Third World'" nations 
to undertake a planned economy. He argues that the
adoptation of statism, which called for the artificial 
stimulation of the economy through government
intervention, and which was chosen largely as a result of 
the crisis in 1929 , accounts for the dramatic economic
upturn in Turkey until the eve of World War II (Finefrock 
1981, 375).
On the other hand, O.Mehmet points to the negative 
impact of etatism : "Far from being an experiment in 
populist egalitarianism, etatism served as a model of 
state capitalism managed primarily for the benefit of a 
privileged elite controlling the state apparatus. By the 
1970s Turkey had acquired one of the most unequal 
patterns of income distribution in the world" (Mehmet 
1983, 53). According to this view, the socio-economic
inequalities, the roots of the crisis of the 1970s, were 
actually implemented in the Turkey of the 1930s, when 
economic and political elitism emerged as the devepolment 
strategy.
After World War II, during the Democratic Party 
period of the 1950s, the bourgeoisie was allowed a free 
hand and a class of capitalists in agriculture was born. 
The aid received by the government and the increased 
earnings from exports ( due to good weather and the boom 
created by the Korean War) benefited the agricultural
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sector most. In 1953, this boom in agriculture came to 
an end and production began to stagnate. Turkey’s brief 
’export economy” led to greater trade deficits as primary 
good prices declined world—wide and export earnings 
followed suit (Tuna 1988, 140).
In an effort to find new sources of foreign exchange 
earnings, the DP regime drew up a foreign investment law 
favorable to foreign capital. The DP government also 
established Turkey as a loyal outpost of the West on the 
borders of the Soviet Union. Not only did Turkey join 
NATO ( 1952 ), but it also furnished the US with a string 
of military bases and dispatched a military contingent to 
fight in Korea.
Aid and foreign borrowing remained the only source 
that could be tapped to continue financing the imports 
necessary for economic growth. At first, the Marshall 
Aid and other foreign grants helped, but after 1955, when 
aid was less readily forthcoming, the government 
increasingly turned to covering the current account 
deficit with short-term borrowing. Between 1950-57,
Turkey received 55.8 million in loans from the World Bank 
(Berberoglu 1079, 262).
Continuous borrowing meant an ever-increasing 
external debt. Whereas in 1939 Turkey's total foreign 
debt was 187 million TL, it had reached 5 billion TL by 
1950 (Berberoglu 1975, 262). Turkey's membership in NATO
and CENTO military pacts posed an additional burden on 
the national budget.
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With the general stagnation of the economy and the 
enormous military expenditure ( % 34 of the national
budget in 1950s), the burden of the debt, the continuous 
trade deficit, and the resultant balance of payments 
crisis, as well as the adoptation of austerity measures 
imposed by the IMF, Turkey entered a period of deep 
economic crisis. The DP rule was brought to an end by 
the military in 1960, after it began to ban democratic 
freedoms when faced with social unrest. However, the 
strong economic and military ties established between 
Turkey and the West during their rule have continued to 
this day.
In contrast to the 1950s, the 1960s were good years 
for most countries exporting agricultural and mineral raw 
materials. In the mid 1960s Turkish workers began to 
emmigrate to European countries and sent home remittances 
which were almost equal to exports. During the late 
1960s and early 1970s GNP rose at annual rates of 7 % ,
8 % , and even 10 % making for substantial real growth 
per capita as well (Weiker 1981, 210). Although the 
amount of new foreign private capital during the 1960s 
was significantly higher than in the previous decade, 
assembly-type industries continued to dominate the
industrial sector.
According to some authors, the increase in
productivity did not benefit the large and ever-growing 
masses as the rich got richer (eg. Keyder 1979 ;
Berberoglu 1979). Effective reforms were never carried
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out in agriculture, taxation act to cure the appalling 
unequal distributional problem. Thus, starting with the 
student movements in 1968, extremist groups gradually 
resorted to violence. This led to another repressive 
military interim regime in 1971 that claimed to be 
restoring order and reform following Atatürk. The
resisting student movement was crushed and a new course 
of development begun in Turkey in the 1970s.
In this period, the number of foreign firms 
decreased but the proportion of authorized investment 
which was realized increased. Average new foreign
investment in 1977 was $ 67 million (Weiker 1981, 211).
In the meantime, the global recession of 1973-75, 
aggravated by the explosion of oil prices, drastically 
curtailed the demand for foreign labor in Europe. The 
number of Turks working abroad was reduced by 40 %
(Simpson 1980, 6), Along with this sudden drop in
foreign remittances, Turkey was faced with the economic 
problems of declining commodity markets and quintupled 
oil prices.
These factors brought a sharp reversal in Turkey's 
earlier pattern of foreign trade and payments. In 1976 
the foreign trade deficit was larger than all of Turkey's 
foreign trade five years before. Increasingly, the
payments deficits were covered by loans at high interest 
rates in the Euro-currency market. Inflation jumped from 
14 % in 1973 to 24 % in 1974, 25 % in 1977, 80 % in 1979,
and over 100 Z in 1980. Foreign reserves dropped from $
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1.8 billion in 1973 to $ 600 million in 1977 (Rustow and 
Penrose 1981, 28).
After 1978, Turkish authorities sought to reschedule 
the debts which had piled up. At the same time the 
shortage of available credit has meant that they have 
been forced to reduce imports substantially. In 1979 the 
restrictions on imports were such that industry was 
forced, through lack of raw materials, fuel and 
equipment, to run at levels far below capacity. The 
growth of industry had been extremely import-dependent: 
not only did the original machinery came from abroad, but 
new factories have continued to be dependent on foreign 
raw materials, intermediate goods and spare parts.
The counterpart of the external trading problems was 
stagflation at home. Growth in GNP was 0.2 in 1979. The 
effect on the domestic market of rising dollar import 
prices was compounded by successive devaluations (Tuna 
1988, 146).
Particularly after 1975, Turkey e^tperienced an 
increased level of political instability and terrorist 
violence verging on civil war. Finally, the military 
leaders took power on September 12, 1980. The military
rule endorsed a free market recovery plan drawn up by 
Turgut Ozal who was later elected prime minister.
The start of the 1980s found the Turkish economy in 
a state of crisis. Inflation had burgeoned from below 20 
Z a year in the first half of the 1970s to over 50 Z in 
1978 and surpassed 100.% in 1980 (Krueger 1992, 2).
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The inflation problem had repercussions in other areas of 
the economy. The main root of the problem was a fiscal 
deficit. Governments used instruments of policy to mask 
the effects of inflation while failing to attack the root 
of the problem. The effects of inflation showed itself 
in the area of exchange rate policy, trade policy, and 
the pricing policies of public sector enterprises. The 
exchange rate was artificially held down and the
incentive to export was drastically reduced as a 
consequence. Foreign reserves declined and import
substitution policies were reinforced to prevent this 
drain. Artificially low pricing of the public
enterprises not only introduced further noneconomic
elements into Turkey's price structure ; it also
contributed to the massive fiscal deficits, thus, further 
fueling inflation.
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REFORMS AND THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE 1980s :
Turkish change of economic policy from 1980 onwards 
appears to be a major break with previous practice. 
Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's economic philosophy was 
shaped by his experience in the Turkish bureaucracy and 
in the private sector during the mid 1970s. His reforms 
came in two principal stages : the original stabilization
package of 24 January 1980 and the changes introduced in 
December 1983 after his return to office as prime 
minister .
On January 24, 1980, Turkish government announced a
major economic reform program. The reform program 
included policy changes in the exchange rate, increases 
in the prices of goods and services produced by State 
Economic Enterprises (SEEs), inaguration of a 
stabilization program backed by the IMF, and
liberalization in trade and payments. It was also
announced that the role of the government in economy
would be diminished and that there would be more reliance 
on the private sector for economic growth. The 1980
reform package had as its chief features :
a) Realistic exchange-rate policies : The exchange-rate
was subjected to a large devaluation with promise of 
continuing exchange flexibility in the future. The
Turkish Lira has been adjusted against the dollar, and 
since May 1981 the rate has been announced on a daily
basis.
The intent of this move was to enable the economy to 
achieve balance of payments equilibrium under a much
liberal international trade regime and to stimulate 
exports under a higher real exchange rate.
b) Real interest rates : From July 1980 and onwards
depositors have been given a net return over inflation. 
Equally, the previously artificially low rates to
borrowers have been sharply raised.
c) Tight control over the money supply and credit within 
the context of agreements with the IMF.
d) The ending of most state-sector price subsidies and of 
price control boards.
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e) Tax Reform ; Tax reform was iniated in 1980, 
culminating in the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) 
in 1985.
f) The encouragement of foreign investment and the 
introduction of new legislation and the creation of a 
unified body to handle foreign investment.
In 1983 further changes were introduced by Ozal when he 
returned as the Prime minister :
a) The foreign currency regime was liberalized and there
was considerable progress towards the convertibility of 
the Lira. Turks were allowed to buy and hold foreign
currency, and in the late 1984 the government announced 
that it would accept payment for some of its exports in 
Turkish Lira.
b) Export incentives were made more selective and 
subsidies were reduced.
c) A partial liberalization of imports both of raw 
materials and of some consumer goods, including foods. 
Elimination of duties on imports used in producing export 
goods .
d) Administrative reorganization of the SEEs.
e) A new Five-Year Plan was announced for 1985-89.
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REFORM POLICIES :
1- THE FIRST PHASE (1980-1983) :
The initial program of the 1980-83 period had three 
major components : exchange-rate policy, internal price
policy, and the stabilization policy.
The Exchange-rate Policy :
Turkish Lira was devalued and it was announced that 
the exchange-rate policy would become more flexible with 
more frequent devaluations to make exports more
attractive. The earlier multiple exchange**ra t e system 
was unified considerably.
Banks authorized to hold foreign exchange were 
authorized to retain upto 80 Z of receipts, using them to 
finance imports of oil, petroleum products, fertilizers, 
and raw materials. In addition, allowances for
travellers were increased and trade in gold was
liberalized.
Incentives for exporters were introduced or
enchanced and exporters were permitted to retain $ 10.000
or 5 % of their receipts whichever was greater (Krueger 
1992, 18 ). While all duties on imports used in export
production were eliminated , administrative procedures 
relating to exports were greatly simplified.
At the same time, the import regime was also 
liberalized as the coverage of liberalized list was 
enlarged and advance deposits requirements on imports 
were reduced.
The Pricing Policy :
An important part of the reform program was the 
removal of controls over SEE prices. The intent of this 
move was to correct the fiscal deficit which was largely 
due to rising transfer payments to SEEs for their
-75-
deficits .
According to the reform program, prices of the SEE 
outputs - except coal, fertilizers and electricity 
would be freely determined and with few exceptions, 
government subsidies would no longer be provided.
Measures were also taken to remove control over 
prices of many goods and services provided by the private 
sector. As a result of this liberalization deficits of 
SEEs were greatly reduced in the first half of the 1980s 
(Okyar 1983 , 549 ) .
Fiscal and Monetary Policy :
In addition to reducing the deficits of the SEEs 
through price increases, measures were taken to make 
monetary and fiscal policy less expensive. These
measures included the raising of interest rates and 
imposition of controls over public sector expenditures.
These steps were taken according to an agreement 
with the IMF and in turn, permitted a rescheduling of 
outstanding debt and the commitment of new loans by the 
IMF and the World Bank. On June 18, 1980, the government
of Turkey and the IMF signed a three-year standby 
agreement for SDR 1.25 billion. Terms of the agreement 
are known to have included .’
- ceilings on net domestic assets of the Central Bank.
- ceilings on net borrowing by the public sector,
- liberalization of imports,
- refrain from adopting multiple exchange-rate (Krueger 
1992, 19).
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Over the following year and a half, the government 
adhered fairly strictly to the ceilings agreed upon with 
the IMF and simultaneously, further liberalized the 
import regime.
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2- THE SECOND PHASE (1983- ) :
After the 1983 elections, Turgut Ozal's government 
moved quickly to regain momentum of policy reforms which 
were focused on achieving structural changes within the 
economy especially with regard to import-competing and 
export industries .
Stabilization was forgotten as government 
expenditures began rising sharply and inflation 
accelerated.
The second phase of the government reforms included 
deregulation of banks, freeing of interest rates, 
creation of a foreign exchange market, and reduced taxes 
on financial transactions. In addition, increased 
incentives for the efficiency in the SEEs were 
introduced.
In December 1983 authorities announce^d that they 
intended to provide incentives more through the exchange 
rate and less through special export incentives. The 
government also intended to move toward a unified 
exchange-rate for all transactions.
In addition, steps were taken to increase the 
attractiveness of Turkey for private foreign investors. 
These included the easing of conditions governing the
transfer of profits, the general relaxation of capital 
and exchange market controls.
During this period, further changes were made in the 
trade policy in order to encourage exports and liberalize 
trade. Between 1980 and 1985, depreciation continued and 
as a result the real cost of foreign exchange in 1985 in 
terms of domestic power was about twice what it had been 
in 1979. This itself constituted a major change in the 
incentive for exporting.
In 1984 ”EP Decree’ further enchanced the benefits 
granted by incentives through access to low interest 
credits from the newly established special funds, 
exemptions from some direct and indirect taxes and fees, 
allocation of foreign exchange up to 50 % of the total
commitment, and duty free exports. Although in 198 5 the 
GATT subsidy code was signed to phase out all subsidies 
on exports, by 1986 export tax rebates were reintroduced 
with rates of 8 % for manufactures and thereafter the
number of items eligible for tax rebates were raised 
(Barchardl985,51).
In the case of imports, quantitative restrictions 
were removed and tariffs were reduced. This offset a 
considerable portion of the increased real price of 
foreign exchange that importers had to pay. Protection 
accorded to import-competing industries was thus greatly 
r educ ed.
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THE RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS AND
THE STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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Turkey's economic achievements in the 1980s cannot 
be underestimated. Its export leap in the initial years 
of the decade took place during the severest world 
recession experienced by the OECD economies in the period 
after the World War II.
The IMF and the World Bank were closely responsible 
for drawing up the country’s 1979-80 stabilization plans 
and both institutions have presented Turkey in their 
publications as the prime example of how IMF 
stabilization policies could succeed without pitfalls 
associated with programmes applied in the Southern Cone 
countries (Toksdz 1988, 40).
According to David Barchard, Ozal's reforms and his 
free-market and export-oriented policies have brought 
impressive results :
Ozal's reforms have brought impressive results. 
The volume of foreign trade has risen shaply.
Eports have risen from $ 2.9 bn in 1980 to $ 7.1 bn 
in 1985, while imports grew less swiftly from $ 7.9
bn in 1980 to $ 10.6 bn in 1985. Shortages and 
power cuts virtually disappeared. Capacity 
utilization, which was 51.2 per cent in Turkish 
industry in 1980, rose by 1984 to over 70 per cent. 
Inflation fell from three-digit levels in 1980 to 24 
per cent in 1982, though it was 39 per cent in 1983. 
and apparently 53 per cent in 1984. Most 
strikingly, GNP growth was swiftly resumed : from
declines of 0.4 per cent in 1979 and 1.1 per cent in 
1980, GNP rose by 4.1 per cent in 1981, 4,6 per cent
in 1982, 3.2 per cent in 1983 (when Ozal was out of
office) and an estimated 5.7 per cent in 1984," 
(Barchard 1985, 36).
However, Barchard does not provide any information 
on the social effects of Özal s economic policies and the 
implementation of the EP strategy in Turkey. He says, 
"The alleged increase in unemployment and income 
inequality are so far hard to measure.” But he states 
that "opposition appears to be strongest among the fixed 
income groups, particularly civil servants. Fear that
the austerity programmes might lead to outbreaks of 
violence have not been born out by events, and the law- 
and-order machinery set up after 1980 in any case makes 
disorder unlikely,” (Barchard 1985, 36-37).
In order to assess the results of the economic 
reforms of the 1980s, it is beneficial to examine the 
indicators of economic performance as well as the quality 
of life indicators,
a) Economic Growth :
Although Turkey's economic growth in the early 1980s 
was better than what it had been in the late 1970s and 
superior to that of most developing countries in the
midst of the worlwide recession, it was not until 1984 
that growth rates accelerated. As can be seen in Table 
6.1, real GDP growth averaged more than 5 % after 1984.
However, in recent years there have been large
fluctuations in the growth rate. While in 1989 the GNP 
growth was 1.9 %, it jumped to 9.2 % in 1990 and again
dropped to 1.3 % in the first part of 1991 displaying
serious signs of economic instability (Yasadığımız Dünya 
1992, 191).
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Table 6.1 :
Indicators of Macroeconomic Performance, 1980-89 
(percentage)
Year Real GNP 
growth *
Growth of real 
investment
Growth of 
exports
1980 -1.1 -6 . 9 28.7
1981 4.2 1.8 61.6
1982 4.5 3.2 22.2
1983 3.3 2.9 -0.3
1984 5.9 -0.1 24.5
1985 5 . 1 16.8 11.6
1986 8.1 11.0 -6.3
1987 7.4 5 . 5 36.7
1988 3.7 -1.6 14.4
1989 1 . 7 -3.4 -0.3
Real GNP at 1986 prices.
Source : Turkey. Country Studies No:9 International Center
for Economic Growth. 1992. San Fransisco, ICS Press.
b) Exports :
Exports rose sharply and were more than 50 % over
their corresponding 1980 level for the first half of 
1981. Industrial exports rose even more rapidly and were 
more than double their 1979 level by 1981. By 1983, 
Turkish export earnings were $ 5.7 billion, compared with
$ 2.9 billion in 1980 [See Table 6.1].
In the late 1970s, exports constituted only about 7 
Z of GNP . By 1987 , the share of exports in GNP had risen 
to 21 %. This represented a tripling of the export share 
in GNP in less than 8 years. That increase was
accompanied with an average annual rate of growth of 
export earnings (in US dollars) of 18.9 Z over the 1980- 
8 8 per i od.
Thus, the removal of quantitative restrictions, 
tariff reductions, export incentives, and a more 
realistic real exchange rate all served to increase the 
relative and absolute attractiveness of exporting.
All major categories of exports grew, although 
exports of industrial goods grew much more rapidly than 
did the exports of agricultural commodities', and mineral 
products exports grew very little except for a short­
lived burst in the late 1980s. While agricultural
commodities constituted 57 Z of exports in 1975 and 
1980s, their share of total exports had fallen to 18 Z in 
1989. Conversely, the share of industrial goods in total 
exports rose rapidly, reaching 78 Z by 1989 [See Table 
6 .2 ] .
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Table 6.2
Export Earnings by Major Coomodity Categories 
1975-1989
( millions of U.S. dollars )
Agr i culture 
livestock
and Mineral
products * Manufactures
1975 793 (57) 106 (8) 338
1980 1,672 (57) 191 (7) 800
1981 2,219 (47) 193 (4) 1,172
1982 2,141 (37) 175 (3) 2,517
1983 1,881 (33) 189 (3) 2,756
1984 1,749 (25) 240 (3) 3,928
1985 1,719 (22) 244 (3) 4,976
1986 1,886 (25) 247 (3) 4,479
1987 1,853 (18) 272 (3) 6,879
1988 2,341 (20) 377 (3) 7,728
1989 2,127 ( 18) 413 (4) 7,915
* Numbers in parentheses indicate percentages of total 
exports .
Source : Turkey Country Studies No: 9 , International
Center For Economic Growth. San Fransisco, ICS Press.
In the case of manufactured exports, all categories 
grew rapidly. In 1980, textiles constituted about half 
of manufactured exports. Most categories of manufactured 
exports grew at average annual rates in excess of 20 Z 
[See Table 6.3 J .
The OECD performed an extensive analysis of 
manufactured exports for a number of countries,
classifying exports into five broad categories : scale­
intensive industries, labor-intensive industries,
resource-intensive industries, differentiated goods, and 
science-based industries. (OECD 1987).
When analyzed on this basis, according to the OECD 
report, labor-intensive industries constituted 46 Z of 
total exports in 1987. Exports based on raw materials 
extracted in Turkey accounted for 17 Z. Iron and steel
and industrial chemicals were the only sizable industries 
classified as sca1e-intensive . Even there, a great deal
of iron and steel exports consisted of re-exported 
processed scrap metal - itself a labor-intensive process 
[See Table 6.3].
Thus, more than three quarters of Turkish exports in 
1987 were either directly labor-intensive or were based 
on the availability of natural resources. Clearly, the 
quality and the availability of Turkey's labor force 
played a significant role in the development of export 
industries, although other factors were involved as well.
In the first years of the export drive, there had 
been some skepticism about whether exporting out of
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Classification of Exports by Nature of Commodity, 1987 
Percentage of total
Categorization of Exportable Commodity 
manufacturing exports
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Table 6.3 :
Resource-intensive industries
Food, beverages, and tobacco 
Leather, except footwear and apparel 
Wood, wood and wood products 
except furniture 
Pulp, paper, and paperboard 
Petroleum products
Other nonmetallic mineral products 
Nonferrous metal basic industries
17
11
0
0 
0 
2 , 
0 , 
1,
Labor-intensive industries 
Textiles 
Apparel 
Footwear
Furniture and fixtures, except 
primary metal 
Scrap metal 
Other manufacturing
Sca1e-intensive industries
Paper, paper products, printing, 
and publishing 
Industrial chemicals 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Pottery, china, and earthware 
Glass and glass products 
Iron and steel basic industries 
Transport equipment
Differentiated goods
Engines and turbines
Agricultural machinery and equipment 
Metal and woodworking machinery 
Special industrial machinery 
Machinery and equipment
Other electrical machinery, appliances 
and supplies
Photographic and optical goods 
and watches
45
15
26
0
0 . 
2 , 
0 ,
, 9 
6 
9
3
2
4
5
2 3 . 4
0.6 
8.0 
0 .8 
0 .4
0 
1 
9 
1 .
1 2 . 0  
0 . 1 
0 . 3  
0 . 9
4 . 5
2 . 5
3 . 6  
0 .1
Science-based industries
Other chemical products 
Office, and computing machinery
1 . 7 
1 . 5 
0.0
Source
39
OECD, Economic Surveys (Paris: OECD, 1989/90), p.
excess capacity would continue once domestic demand 
recovered. That question was decisively answered in the 
latter half of the decade when economic growth 
accelerated and exports continued to grow.
The fact that a very large fraction of increased 
exports, especially in the early 1980s, were destined for 
Iraq and Iran was another source of concern. That 
concern too, was put to rest when these countries reduced 
their imports from Turkey, but overall Turkish exports 
continued growing.
Lastly, one of the main concerns was the claims of 
"Faked Invoicing" or "Fictions Exports." The magnitude 
of export incentives clearly provided an inducement for 
exporters to overstate the value of their foreign 
exchange earnings and export volumes. Unofficial reports 
indicate that around 15 % of the 1987 export revenues of
$ 10.4 bn may be accounted for in this way (Toksöz 1988,
50) .
c) Investment :
The fall in investments in 1979 and in 1980 was 
replaced by a growth of 3.5 % in fixed investments. As a 
result industrial output in real terms rose by 7.2 Z, GNP 
by 4.2 %, and GNP per capita by 1.9 Z . All this was 
brought about mainly through fuller utilization of 
installed capacity (Hiç 1985, 332).
In the early 1980s, observers had been concerned 
that investment was stagnant, even when output growth 
accelerated [see Table 6.1]. Real investment was quite
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siuggish until 1984, but accelerated thereafter. Thus, 
in early years of the reform program, growth came mainly 
from the fuller utilization of existing capacity; it was 
not until the mid-1980s that the reoriented trade regime 
was consisted with an increase in real investment.
In 1984, improved economic atmosphere had a 
beneficial impact on direct foreign investments. The 
total estimated volume of direct foreign investments 
amounted to $ 1.250 million by the end of 1985 (Tusiad 
1986, 186) . Most foreign investments concentrated on
manufacturing. Additional investments have taken place 
in tourism and on a growing scale in banking [see Table 
6 .4 ].
On the other hand, gross national savings rose to 
18.1 % of GNP in 1981 from a low of 15.6 % in 1980 and
then declined to 16 Z in 1983 after the 1982 financial 
crisis. By 1985 savings had reached 18 Z of GNP once 
again and further rose to 20 % .
d) Balance of Payments :
The most striking feature of an examination of 
balance of payments is the simultaneous increase in both 
exports and imports. The hallmark of Turkish reforms in 
the 1980s was an opening up of the economy, and both 
exports and imports constituted a lager share of economic 
activity. The trade deficit was in the range of $ 2.7 
billion by 1982, and thereafter the deficit was in the 
range of $ 2.8 to $ 3.1 billion every subsequent year.
The change in the balance of payments was
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Table 6.4 :
Foreign Investment
1988 1989 1990
Foreign Investment (mn$) 354 663 622
Sector Limits Allocated
for Foreign Investment (million $)
Agriculture 27,3 9,8 65 ,1
Mining 5,2 10,6 45,5
Manufacturing 484,1 901,0 1143,1
Services 307,8 549,0 530,6
Total 824,5 1470,5 1784,3
Country Limits Allocated
(million $)for Foreign Investment
EC 383,8 907,1 1248,6
Other OECD Countries 325,4 383,9 359,8
Muslim Countries 51,0 104,5 55,0
Other 64,3 75,0 120,9
S o u r c e  : S t a t e  P l a n n i n g  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  1991.
accomplished despite two adverse shifts. Interest
payments to service the foreign debt rose from $ 1.1
billion in 1980 to $ 2.8 billion in 1988. The demand for 
Turkish workers in Western Europe fell in response to the 
recession, and consequently, workers' remittances 
declined during the decade from a peak of $ 2.4 billion
in 1981 (Krueger 1992, 33).
d) Foreign Debt :
Although considerable progress was made during 1980- 
83 on the balance of payments front, certain developments 
in trade did not fare well. Total export receipts
stagnated after the peak reached in the previous year, 
and there was further deterioration in external terms of 
trade in 1983.
Furthermore, despite continued growth in
international reserves during 1983, even the peak reached 
in November was equivalent to less than three months of 
1983 imports (Nas and Odekon 1988, 20).
Thus, although the current account deficit 
diminished after 1981, financing for the external deficit 
was still required from 1980 to 1987. That financing
neccessarily originated primarily from new borrowing. 
Some observers have suggested that Turkey's successful 
macroeconomic growth performance of the 1980s was 
attributable to the increased imports that were financed 
partly by accumulation of additional debt (eg. Collins 
1989, 14).
As indicated earlier, Turkish debt was rescheduled
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as a part of the 1980 reform package. From a level of $ 
19 billion in 1980, Turkish debt rose by less than $ 1 
billion by the end of 1982 [see Table 6.5]. Even in 
1984, it grew by only $ 1.3 billion. Thereafter, 
however, it rose by $ 6.8 billion in 1986, $ 8 billion in
1987, and then declined by $ 2.1 billion in 1988.
Thus, Turkey received new loans during the 1980s,
although its magnitude appears to be no larger, relative 
to the size of the Turkish economy, than money 
involuntarily lent to other heavily indebted countries 
during the same period. In any event, lending to Turkey 
was voluntary in large part because of successful export 
performance.
e) Tax Reform :
Despite being one of the most important reforms of
the post-1980 era, tax reform has had limited effects so
far; growth in tax revenues has lagged behind the growth
in output.
Tax reform was initiated in 1980, culminating in the 
introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1985. The 
reforms aimed to shift the tax burden away from the 
relatively small minority of the population, consisting 
of employees and corporations, on to the majority of the 
population, namely those who work on the land, the self- 
employed, and small business owners.
Tax on real estate were also increased significantly 
and litigation procedures tightened up to reduce tax 
avoidance. A system of rebates on VAT paid by certain
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Table 6.5 :
Turkish Debt, 1980-88
Magnitude of debt (billions of U .S. dollars) 
Total debt Long term Short term IMF
1980 19.0 15 . 5 2.5 1 . 1
1981 19.2 15 . 7 2.3 1.3
1982 19.7 16.5 1.8 1 . 5
1983 20.3 16.4 2.3 1 . 6
1984 21.6 16 . 9 3.2 1.4
1985 26.0 19 . 9 4.8 1.3
1986 32.8 24.8 6 . 9 1 . 1
1987 40.8 31.3 8 . 7 0.8
1988 38.7 30.7 7 . 7 0.3
Note : Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source : Turkey. Country Studies No: 9, International
Institute for Economic Growth. 1992 San Fransisco, ICS 
Press .
categories of people also served to monitor small 
business incomes and forced the introduction of cash 
tills to give receipts (Toksoz 1988, 42).
According to a recent OECD study (1987), in 1981,
following the start of the tax reform total revenues rose 
to 19 % and then declined again. In 1984 the share fell 
to 14.6 % as the government increased tax rebates and
reduced a number of indirect taxes to stimulate exports 
and investment (OECD 1987).
f) Inflation :
When inflation reached 110 % in 1980, the first
measures taken by the then deputy minister, Turgut Ozal , 
were to abolish the Price Control Committee set up in 
1978, adjust the exchange-rate to realistic levels, and 
free controls on vital industrial imports. These steps 
eased supply bottlenecks whxch were contrxbuting to
inflation. The control of wage demands brought about 
restrictions on trade union activities was the next 
important factor (Toksoz 1988, 48).
In its initial phase, the major success of the
program was to bring about a reduction in inflation. By 
early 1981, it was estimated that inflation had dropped 
to 35 %, contrasted with its high in 1980 of 110 % ; it
remained at about that rate through 1982 [see Table 6.6]. 
In 1983 inflation accelerated as government expenditures 
increased before the election and as the new economxc 
team reversed earlier restrictive policies.
In the second phase of the reform program, inflation
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Table 6.6 :
Indicators of Macroeceonomic Performance, 1980-89 
(pe rcentage)
Increase in consumer 
price index
Increase in GNP 
deflator
1980 110 104
1981 37 42
1982 31 28
1983 31 28
198A 48 50
1985 45 44
1986 35 31
1987 39 38
1988 75 6 6
1989 70 67
SOURCE
Center
; Turkey. Country Studies 
for Economic Growth. 1992,
No: 9. International 
. San Fransisco, ICS Press
has been persistently at high rates. In large part, this 
is because of persistently large government expenditures 
which were directed toward the development of 
infrastructure. Government expenditures were 25 % of GNP 
in 1980, fell to a low of 18.9 Z in 1985, and rose to the 
21-22 % range for the following three years. Moreover, 
the fiscal deficit rose from 1.7 Z of GNP in 1981 to 3 % 
in 1983 and 5.3 Z in 1984. Thereafter, it was once again 
sharply reduced to 2.8 Z in 1985 , but rose to 3.6 and 4.5 
Z in the following two years. In 1988, fiscal deficit 
stood at 3.4 % of GNP (Krueger 1992, 38).
The reasons for this high deficit were numerous : 
interest payments on domestic and foreign debt and 
increased government expenditures before each election 
can be listed as two of them. Thus, these rises and 
falls in government expenditure and fiscal deficit 
influence rate of inflation which constitutes a major 
threat to the efforts in orienting the Turkish economy 
toward the international economy.
Resolution of the inflation problem is not only a 
political necessity for Turkey but also essential for 
achieving a more stable real-exchange rate. While until 
1989 the exchange-rate was managed so that the real value 
of the Turkish Lira did not appreciate in response to the 
changes in the domestic price level, in 1989, the nominal 
exchange-rate changed at approximately half the rate of 
inflation. This, in turn, contributed to the slowdown of 
the rate of growth of exports.
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g) State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) :
The deficits of the State Economic Enterprises 
(SEEs) have been the major burdens of the public budget 
since the 1930s· Within the framework of the
stabilisation programme the law of 20 May 1983 made a 
basic distinction between the profit-oriented SEEs, 
called the State Economic Corporations (SECs), which were 
given the freedom of determining their own prices and 
accounts, and public-service-oriented Public Economic 
Agencies (PEAs), that is utility companies, monopoly 
goods and basic services.
Since the end of 1983, the emphasis has been on 
decentralization of state involvement and intervention in 
management and financing, aimed at promoting self­
financing of current costs, growth of the participation 
of SEEs' own savings and capital in new investments, and 
compliance with the market mechanism instead of reliance 
on administration, government protection and subsidies 
(Tiisiad 1990, 11). In addition, after the election of
October 1991, the new government announced its plans 
towards the privatisation of SEEs in order to increase 
efficiency and reduce the public burden of SEEs.
However, although certain improvement in the SEE 
accounts has been registered since 1981, the SEE demand 
for public funds and domestic and foreign borrowing has 
still been substantial,
h) Population and Employment :
The rapid economic development of Turkey has brought
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in its wake rapid social changes, the most important of 
which is the rural to urban shift of the population. 
Three quarters of Turkey’s rural population lived in sub­
districts and villages at the end of the Second World War 
[see Table 6.7]. By 1965 this had fallen to two thirds 
and by 1985 to 47 % .
Between 1945 and 1965 the urban population (those 
living in province and district centers) increased at an 
average rate of 43 S a year. Between 1965 and 1985 it 
increased at 47 % a year. Turkish administrators have
been unable to keep up with the employment and social 
requirements of this influx of people into the cities.
The population as a whole grew at around 2.4 % a
year in 1965-8 5, and at 2.1 Z in 1990 [see Table 6.8]. 
This rate of growth has added an average of 400.000 new 
entrants into the economically active group (twelve years 
and older) since 1970, yielding an increase of 2.3 Z a 
year. According to the official employment statistics, 
the potential civilian labor force (those 15 years and 
older, both employed and seeking employment) rose at an 
avarage rate of 1.6 Z a year in the 15 years to 1985. 
Yet civilian employment ( not including people engaged in 
defense related activities ) grew at an average of only 1 
Z a year over the same period (Toksoz 1988, 64).
While the official figures show unemployment rising 
from 12.5 Z in 1970 to 16.7 Z in 1985 , or nearly to 3 mn 
people, nonofficial estimates put the ratio higher at 
around 20 Z [see Table 6.9].
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Table 6.7 :
Population by city and village, 1927-85
Total
population 
( ' 000)
Province 
and district 
centres 
(Z of total)
Sub-districts 
and villages 
(% of total)
Annual
avarage growth
1927-45 1.8 2.0 1.7
1945-65 2.6 4.3 1.9
1965-85 2.4 4.7 0.7
Source : State Planning Organization, 1987 .
Table 6.8 :
Demography, Culture, Military
1970 1980 1990
Demography
Population million 35,3 44,4 55,9
Density /km square 45,2 56,9 71,6
Growth/yr % 2,5 2,3 2,1
Birth rate 5,3 4,3 3,7
Infant mortality 7. 133,6 111,0 69,0
Life expectancy yr 55,9 61,7 65,1
Urban population % 38,4 43,8 61,3
Culture
Illiterate % 48,7 34,4 19,3
Phys i c ians /thousand 0,45 0.7 0,8
Secondary Sch. % 42,6 46,9 66,0
College % 6,0 6,1 11,3
Televisions % 11,0 7.9,0 172
Published books 5 854 3 396 6 685
Military
Navy thousand 37,5 45 55
Air Force thousand 50 52 67,4
Land Force thousand 390 470 525
Source : Yaşadığımız Dünya, 1992.
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Table 6.9
Labor market trends, 1970-1984 (’000)
1970 1975 1980 1984
Population 35,605 40,348 44,737 50,664
Economically active 15,119 17,348 19,219 21,219
(% of total pop.) 42.5 43.1 43.0 42.0
Participation ratios * 71.8 68.5 63.1 60.0
Labor force: supply 14,375 15,916 17,063 18,016
Labor force: demand 13,682 14,696 15,231 15,706
Non-agricultural
labor surplus 692 1,220 1,832 2,310
Disguised unemployment
in agriculture 1,100 900 700 665
Total unemployment 1,792 2,120 2,532 2,935
Unemployment (%) 12.5 13.3 14.5 16 . 5
Civilian labor supply 
by sex (15 +)
ma 1 e 
f ema1e
8,911
5,464
10,421
5,495
11,363 
5 , 700
12,313 
5 , 703
* Employed and unemployed persons aged 15 years and over as 
a proportion of total 15 + age group.
Source : State Planning Organization, 1987.
According to Krueger and Aktan, as a result of rapid 
growth of investment and output utilities and transport, 
and due to government's emphasis on developing 
infrastructure to support private industry, industrial 
employment grew considerably faster than manufacturing 
employment, rising from 1.996.000,- persons employed in 
industry in 1981 to 2.271.000,- employed in 1985, and to 
2.561.000,- in 1989. The authors conclude, however, that 
given the rapid growth of the Turkish labor force, even 
this growth of employment opportunities was 
disappointing. Consequent1y, this leads to concerns
about the impact of the policy reform on income 
distribution in Turkey (Krueger 1992, 38).
i) Education and Literacy :
Education has been a particularly glaring problem in 
rural areas, although the education system in the country 
as a whole needs urgent attention. Of the total
population aged six years and over 32.5 % were still
illiterate in 1980, while another 16.5 % could read but 
had no formal educational diploma. In 1980 2.2 Z of the 
total population were graduates of a university or a 
higher education institute. These statistics reflect yet 
again the heavy rural bias in the country. Among the 
total economically active population 89 % of those
classified as illiterate were in agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing (State Institute of Statistics) [see Table 
6 . 8 ] .
Literacy among women, a telling indicator of social
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development is a particularly acute problem in Turkey. 
45 Z of Turkish women were illiterate in 1980, compared 
with 20 Z of men (men are given a second chance to learn 
to read and write in the army) . Despite the recovery in 
the economy, women's position in the labor market has not 
improved in recent years. A breakdown of civilian labor 
by sex shows that, in 1970, women made up 38 % . This
has fallen to 33 % by 1980 and 31 % by 1984 . High
unemployment has caused women to drop out of the labor 
market although the overall the overall participation 
ratio has also fallen. While the number of employed
poeple and unemployed people aged 15 and over who were 
seeking employment accounted for 72 Z of the total 15 and 
over age group in 1970, by 1984 it was only 60 % (Toksoz 
1988, 68).
j) Income Distribution :
Neoclassical economics suggests that the income 
distribution of a country with abundant labor and low 
wage rates is expected to improve as the country adopts 
an outward-oriented trade strategy. Better allocation of 
resources, according to this view, not only improves the 
distribution of income but it also increases the income 
per capita. This is because, when low cost labor is used 
in the production of exports, wages increase. At the same 
time, due to lower demand the cost of capital decreases. 
Thus, a country gains in both ways when it adopts an 
outward-oriented trade strategy based on its comparative 
advantage.
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However, in Turkey such a development has not
occured. The high inflation prevalent in the Turkish
economy since 1978 and the monetarist economic policies 
used to counter inflation together with the international 
economic recession in this period, all contributed to the 
worsening of income distribution in Turkey.
Between 1974-77, the income distribution became 
increasingly unequa 1 and from 1978 and onwards the 
inequality in incomes reached unacceptable levels. Since 
the period 1974-77 is characterized by a sharp increase 
in income, there occured no absolute impoverishment in 
this period. However, during the period from 1978 to
1985, the per capita income has declined and the income 
distribution has been biased unfavorably against the low 
and fixed income groups and has led to impoverishment 
(Kazgan 1985, 459). When it is considered that the lower 
and fixed income groups constitute the 80-85 % of the
total population , the results of the economic reforms of 
the 1980s do not seem that successful.
Today, the main problems, particularly affecting the 
low-income groups, still exist .* high unemployment, high 
inflation, a scarcity of local capital for long-term 
investment and inequality of income. The comparative 
statistics illustrate the country’s relative
backwardness:
’Whereas the net annual increase in population in 
Britain and West Germany is 0.7 percent, and around 
7 percent in Greece, Spain and Portugal, the Turkish 
population is growing by 2.3 percent a year. This 
is despite a very high infant mortality rate in
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Turkey: 131 per thousand in 1982, as compared with
16 per thousand in Greece, 26 per thousand in 
Portugal, and around 11.7 in Britain and West 
Germany.
....Literacy statistics are disputed, but the 1980 
census suggests that approximately a third of the 
population aged eleven and older is still 
illeterate. Health statistics present a similar 
contrast. The startling disparity in infant 
mortality already mentioned has long puzzled 
demographers, since it is well above what is 
generally expected for a country of Turkey's socio­
economic level. Life expectancy, too, is lower : 
about 54 years for males in Turkey, compared with 65 
in Portugal, 70 in Greece, Spain and West Germany, 
and 68 in Britain. Figures for doctors per thousand 
of the population are also well below other OECD 
countries (Barchard 1985, 103)."
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TOWARD AN EXPLANATION :
After adopting the EP strategy and implementing 
outward-oriented development policies, Turkey has reached 
higher economic growth and export levels. During the 
first few years, the apparent success of the program was 
a welcome break from the unfavorable results of the 
earlier programs. The foreign debt situation improved 
significantly, and a superior export performance became a 
leading indicator of progress, as well as a hopeful sign 
of what more could be accomplished.
As the first few years come to an end, however, the 
initial wave of optimism on the potential success of the 
reforms, has faded at least for some. Trade and budget 
deficits remain, and the problems of high inflation and 
unemployment continue to involve critical "macrochoices" 
(Nas 1988, 1).
Here the question to be asked is : why could Turkey
not reach the growth and economic success levels similar
to that of NICs although it also adopted the EP strategy 
and outward-oriented trade policy ? Some answers are 
suggested below :
a) Physical and Geographical Characteristics :
Unlike the NICs, Turkey is rich in natural 
resources; its large volume of arable land provides 
plenty of food supply; and due to the large population, 
the size of the domestic market constitutes an adequate 
initial base for industrialisation.
Turkey is relatively land-abundant and is favored 
with a variety of climatic conditions, including : (1)
the Mediterranean Coast, where cotton, citrus, tree 
crops, and fresh fruit and vegetables vie for rich land ; 
(2) the Anatolian Plateau, colder and with somewhat 
poorer soil, which probably has a comparative advantage 
in livestock and, to a lesser extent, wheat and other 
grains ; and (3) the Black Sea region, where tobacco and 
hazelnuts are major crops.
In addition to land, the country has large deposits 
of chrome, copper, coal, iron ore, and a variety of other 
minerals. However, there is little oil, and the country 
imports its entire supply.
Therefore Turkey’s existence does not depend 
exclusively on its ability to earn foreign exchange 
through export of goods and services. Consequently, 
Turkey employed a broadly restrictionist trade strategy 
until the 1980s.
On the other hand, similar to NICs, Turkey's
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strategic geographical location is suitable to engage in 
trade. However, in Turkey this strategic location has 
mostly been used in determining her international stance. 
Turkey has been a member of NATO and has supported the
largest army of any European NATO country. Because of
proximity as well as a commonality of religion and 
heritage, there also exist strong links to the Middle 
East.
Thus, the availability of resources, a large 
domestic market, and abundant arable land, did not 
necessitate an engagement in the manufactured export 
trade in Turkey for survival as was the case in the NICs. 
Even after 1980s, it is difficult to convey the full
extent of the transformation of the economy and of
attitudes toward exporting in Turkey,
b) Political Survival :
Although after the War of Independence and the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic governments 
emphasized industrial development based on etatism with 
the fear of foreign economic dominance, Turkey's
political survival was not closely tied to economic 
development as was the case with NICs.
Turkish proximity to the former Soviet Union was not 
the same as the NICs' proximity to threats from N.Korea, 
China, and Malaysia. Being a member of NATO Turkey 
received military as well as economic aid from the United 
States and Western European countries throughout the Cold 
War. At the same time, Turkish officials never doubted
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the strength of their large military in case of an 
unexpected invasion .
c) Population :
Although Turkey has a large population of 55.9 
millions, it is also a land-abundant and resource rich 
country. With 66 Z high school enrollment and only 11.3 
Z college enrollment rates in 1990, it is clear that 
Turkey's labor force lacks the necessary education and 
skills .
In the initial years of export drive, the
availability of labor ready to work in less pleasant 
occupations and under harsh conditions with low wages has 
been a comparative advantage factor for Turkey. However, 
the presence of unskilled labor force may constitute 
difficulties in efforts to produce manufactured exports 
with more efficiency and qreater quality.
Thus, absence of skilled labor and large population 
creates a problem in Turkey's development efforts based 
on the expectations of competing in international export 
markets .
e) US Aid :
Throughout the Cold War, since Turkey, a member of 
NATO, was in close proximity with the former Soviet 
Union, Americans made a commitment to Turkey and offered 
military and economic aid.
At the end of the Second World War, US aid under the 
Point Four Program and then the Marshall Plan was 
directed largely toward the development of infrastructure
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and agriculture. The government established very high 
support prices for agricultural commodities, and in 
addition, a sizable fraction of aid was allocated for the 
conversion of pastureland and forests in the Anatolian 
Plateau into wheat-growing areas (Krueger 1978,45).
Although Marshall Plan aided greately in the
development of the agricultural base, after the Plan, US 
aid consisted mostly of military financing. While in 
NICs US provided trade concessions, technical advice and 
assistance in almost every sphere of life, in Turkey, 
American commitment was limited to military 
considerations .
The IMF and the World Bank did support Turkey's 
%economic liberalization efforts in the 1980s. However, 
their assistance was often limited to rescheduling of 
debts and advices of stricter austerity measures,
f) The Role of the Government :
On January 24, 1980, when the Turkish government 
announced a major economic reform program, it was also 
announced that the role of the government in the economy 
would be diminished, that there would be more reliance on 
the private sector for economic growth.
During the period between 1980 and 1983 the economic 
reforms were intended to strengthen market forces and 
competition by opening up the Turkish economy to the rest 
of the world. Simultaneously, state controls over
economic activity would be reduced.
Similarly, when Turgut Ozal became prime minister
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after the 1983 elections, the new government moved 
quickly to regain momentum of policy reforms which were 
focused almost entirely on achieving structural changes 
within the economy, especially with regard to the role of 
import-competing and export industries and the role of 
private and public sectors.
However, despite the determinism of Turgut Ozal, the 
liberalization of the economy and the reduction of 
government controls and/or the limitation of the
government's role to a planner and a facilitator of 
developments has not been fullfilled. The role of the
government and of the SEEs in the economy remain 
considerable.
Turgut Ozal’s government played a strong role in the 
planning and implementation of the development policies. 
Measures such as the incentives, tax rebates, and
infrastructure investments shifted the composition of 
what is profitable and influenced the course of
production in the market.
Similar to NICs, in Turkey too, the impact of the 
governmental policies extended far beyond economic policy 
to include political controls at least during the first 
phase of the reforms. This is because, the economic 
policies were implemented right after the military coup 
of 1980 with almost no objection from either the 
opposition groups or the businessmen.
Similarly, the economic reforms gained momentum 
during the 1984 import regime when the government's
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political support was at its peak. As a result, the 
military rule and the political support in 1984 have 
constituted one sphere of the stabilization program 
characterized by an apparent lack of criticism,
especially from the private sector, which had been 
influencial in the direction taken by the economic
policies and outspoken on issues like the shortages and 
the price of bank credits (Nas 1988, 22).
However, in the following years, especially after 
the October 1991 elections, the new Demirel government 
has been subjected to continuous criticisms by the 
private sector about not fulfilling their promises of
reducing inflation and providing new efforts in
privatisation and liberalization,
g) Commitment to Public Policy I
Similar to NICs, Turkey too, has made a historical
shift in public policy at a point in time (in 1980) to an 
export-oriented strategy which made exports the focus of 
the economic policy and the development strategy.
However, Turkey could not display the commitment to 
the export-oriented growth as did the NICs. Commitment 
to the EP strategy entails a holistic and internally 
consistent shift in the entire range of relevant economic 
policies. In Turkey, on the other hand, neither the 
economic policies of export-growth nor stabilization were 
consistently followed and thus, the commitment to the EP 
strategy has been partial.
For example : between 1982, when Turgut Ozai
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re s i g n e d the deputy p r e m i e r s li i p and 1984, after 11 \ e 
bankruptcies that followed the 1 982 fIn a n c i a 1 c r i s i s , 
there was a reversal of the tight money, i in p o i't: a n d 
i. n t e r e s t r a t e libera 1 i z a t. i o n p o I i c i e s .
vSimi. larly, during the election years of 1986 and 
19 8 7, c o n t: r o 1 over t. 11 e in a c r o e c o n o m i c aggregates were 
con s i. d e r a b 1 y r r· 1 a x e d f o r p o 1. i t i cal. reasons. In a d d i t i. o n , 
contrary t. o its a u s t e r i t: y r h e t o r; i c , the 0 z a 1 g o v e r n m e n t 
has been on a spending spree which has been increasingly 
funded by foreign borrowing. T, i k e w i s e, in contrast with
the rhetoric, the fact that pul) lie investment continues 
to outstrip private investment displays that the
reduction of the government's role in the economy and the 
serious restructuring and privatisation of the SEEs 
remain distant goals and further accelerates inflation 
(Toksoz 1988, 40).
h) Political Stability :
It was stated before t: h a t an important c o n d i t. i o n f o r· 
the success of the E P strategy is that the s li i f t i n trade 
strategy is seen to be permanent, providing certainty and 
stability. This ability to provide assurances derives 
from the capacity to sustain policy over the long-run, 
and is a character is* tic of authoritarian rather tlian 
democratic regimes.
While in NICs, models of development depends heavily 
on a degree of political stability, in Turkey the 
successive c fi a n g e s in p o 1 i t: i c a 1 regimes due t o ni i 1 i t a r y 
coups and elections might be another factor which
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contributed to the partial and unstable implementation of 
the EP policy. After every military coup it took a 
considerable period of time to bring back political 
stability and due to these successive changes in the 
political environment, implementation of the EP policy 
ran into difficulties.
Turkish political experience suggests that Turkey's 
armed forces enjoy a virtually unique position among 
Third World countries. The army's unusual status rests 
not only on the centuries-1ong tradition of military 
leadership but also on the strength, unity, and prestige 
of Turkey's military apparatus (Lundington and Spain 
1983, 156). In 1960, 1971, and 1980 the military carried
out coups with the intent of "recreating a democratic 
form of goverment."
Many authors attribute the initial success of the 
reforms of the 1980s to the military which carried out 
the most radical measures (eg. Barchard 1985, Toksoz 
1988, Nas 1988), According to this view, the key 
elements of the stabilisation and liberalisation program 
included cuts in agricultural subsidies, wage curbs, and 
tax reforms, none of which could be implemented by 
parliamentary regimes which relied on the affected strata 
of population for votes. Thus, most of the radical 
measures of the post 1980 period were introduced in the 
initial years under the military rule. These policies, 
according to this view, were consistently put into effect 
before the Qzal government was elected in 1983 ; the
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economic basis has been thereby prepared for an expansion 
in growth.
In his 1987 analysis of Turkish political economy,
C.Keyder suggests an interesting connection between the
recent Turkish experience and economic policies :
"...Political matters were left to the military 
whose programme alluded broadly to the "solidary 
nation" formula of Kemalist times, and set out to 
eradicate "anarchy and terrorism". The same formula 
served to retrospectively condemn democratic 
practices of the 1970s and justify the "restricted 
democracy" framed in the new 1982 constitution.
...The elaborate nexus of state controls and 
distribution policies were to be dismantled through 
a prescription of policies that IMF experts freely 
dispersed. What this blueprint of instant 
liberalism offered (in addition to the sanctity of 
the market) was increasing rates of profit through 
lower wages, reduced social expenditure, and 
declining agricultural incomes. At the same time 
the government would subsidise exports and devalue 
the currency to an acceptable rate. Imports would 
thus be reduced to essentials basically because 
domestic incomes would be lowered; and exports would 
increase due to low wages, a devalued currency, and 
an export promotion policy.
...The new economic measures did lead to an upheaval 
within the manufacturing bourgeoisie. A rapid 
concentration and centralisation of capital took 
place; all but the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie 
were abruptly pushed into an uncertain economic 
environment. There were certainly protests from 
smaller manufacturers and merchants, especially 
concerning the privileges accorded to large firms, 
but the bourgeoisie as a whole seemed to weigh 
political gains against economic losses and made the 
choice for restricted democracy.
...Among workers, small commodity producers, the 
marginal population and the growing ranks of the 
unemployed, real incomes dropped precipitious1y but 
strikes and other protest activity were banned, 
political parties proscribed, and unions rendered 
impotent. The change in income distribution 
reflects only part of the problem in that the social 
expenditures of the state also declined, with 
visible deterioration of public education and public 
health services." (Keyder 1987, 224-226).
These comments emphasi.ze the anti-democratic aspects
of the new liberalization policy providing insight to the 
initial success of the reform programs under the military 
rule and the 1982 constitution.
Thus, with the help of the military, IMF, and the 
1982 constitution, during the initial years, the 5zal 
government maintained the overall objective of the 1980s 
which was to clear the way for the functioning of market 
mechanisms. But, progress in this direction has been
slow since the reforms have not been consistently 
followed and political considerations have undermined 
long-term economic goals.
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CONCLUSIONS :
In the 1960s and 1970s, small countries with little 
domestic markets and natural resources, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, adopted the 
outward-oriented Export Promotion (EP) trade strategy and 
experienced rapid economic growth together with improved 
quality of life indicators. This NIC phenomenon seems to 
be the result of the unusual convergence of a variety of 
forces and circumstances. The most essential elements 
necessary for a successful export-drive are : (1)
commitment by the government to an export-oriented 
strategy based on manufactures, (2) holistic rather than 
partial implementation of the strategy, involving 
consistent exchange-rate, import and export policies, and 
(3) political stability to ensure the implementation of 
these policies over a sustained period of time.
In the case of the NICs these essential public 
policy and political elements have converged over a 
period of time and led to a historic turning in the 
direction of the nation under the EP strategy.
On the other hand, during the period from 1973 to 
1989, Turkey generally followed a moderately outward 
trade strategy, and under the Ozal government it further 
liberalized its trade policy, following a strategy 
similar to the export-led growth model of the NICs based 
on Export Promotion.
Turkey, however, is different from the NICs in some 
important respects : (1) it does not suffer from an
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absence of natural resources that would compel high 
export growth, as was the case in South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Taiwan ; (2) Turkey has a large population
composed of mostly unskilled labor unsuitable to shift 
into higher technology production modes as
industrialisation progreses ; (3) although the ózal
government made clear attempts to implement the outward- 
oriented EP strategy holistically, with consistent 
exchange-rate, import and export policies, the Turkish 
experience suggests that the reforms have been followed 
inconsistently and implemented partially ; (4) the
experience of the NICs sugges(:s that the policy also has 
to be pursued over a long period of time, which in their 
case was made possible by long-run, stable, authoritarian 
regimes. The Turkish political experience, however, is 
characterized by efforts to democratize the system after 
periods of military rule rather than by long-term 
authoritarian dictatorships. Considering the fact that 
Turkey is trying to adopt a democratic rather than 
authoritarian political system, one must take into 
account the possible effects of po1itica1-ideo1ogica1 
competition that would ensue in a democratic system.
The Ozal government adhered to free-market and 
export-oriented policies during its term in office as 
much as possible within the bounds of a parliamentary 
regime where governments tend to be heavily influenced by 
voters* reactions. The Demirel government which came to 
office in 1989 offered the kind of policies seen in.
-114-
Turkey during the (5zal period with less emphasis on 
trade liberalization and almost no success in 
privatisation of the SEEs or the reduction of inflation.
The opposition to the Ozal government’s policies and 
the reforms of the 1980s appears to be the strongest 
among the fixed-income groups. Also smaller Anatolian 
industrialists and traders have been understandably 
opposed to 5zal, while larger scale industrialists in 
Istanbul support the reforms with an enthusiasm 
proportionate to their role as exporters (Barchard 1985, 
37) .
According to Krueger, Turkey stands out for having 
achieved significant economic growth in the decade of the 
1980s, while many other countries were mired in 
stagnation. Successful trade liberalization, according 
to Krueger, was the principal factor for this achievement 
(Krueger 1992 , 5 ) .
Nas, on the other hand, criticizes the economic 
performance of Turkey under the new strategy. He points 
out that, although real depreciation of the currency and 
an outward EP strategy seem to have kept Turkey ahead of 
most LDCs in terms of economic performance, Turkey's 
economic stabilization policies in the 1980s have failed 
to curb inflation and unemployment.
Even though the deficits have been decreasing in 
Turkey, they are still of considerable magnitude. 
Turkish figures compared with others also show that price 
competitiveness alone does not boost exports.
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Factors like quality standards and delivery schedules at 
times may prove as important as prices.
According to Nas, persistent inflation and
unemployment, and increasing indebtedness are the early 
signals Turkish authorities must recognize from the 
former experience. Unless domestic stabilization is
achieved, unless the benefits of EP are distributed and 
shared in an equitable manner, narrowing the current 
account deficit is not a meaningful achievement (Nas 
1988, 39).
It will take several more years before the results 
of the reforms of 1980s can be evaluated. Turkey’s 
industries, with few exceptions - notably textiles 
still operate on too small a scale to make them 
competitive in European markets. However, in the near
future parts of the motor or electronics industries can 
turn into viable large-scale exporters, but that depends 
on Turkey’s success in restructuring its industries, 
attracting large-scale investment and transforming itself 
into a merchant state (Barchard 1985, 40). The more
immediate and pressing objectives right now are more 
limited, and focus on keeping the current account under 
control and attaining price stability.
Turkey is a relative success story among developing 
nations. However, the necessary condition for achieving 
growth and social welfare rates present in NICs and 
industrialized countries, lies in alleviating any 
negative distributional effects that may arise from
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following an outward-oriented policy without the 
necessary preconditions.
For the export-led growth model to be successful in 
Turkey as it was in NICs, there must be a well-educated 
and skilled workforce, holistic commitment to the policy, 
political stability as well as favorable terms of trade 
for the agricultural sector so that the rural laborers, 
who still constitute the majority of the labor force, 
will benefit from the growth as well.
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